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THE RELATION OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY TO JEWISH THOUGHT AND TEACHING¹

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CHRISTIANITY was founded by an historical person who lived in comparatively recent times. Few of us have not seen one or other of our grandparents; some doubtless have looked upon the faces of their great-grandparents. Now Jesus of Nazareth lived, and people were first called Christians, no longer ago than about twenty-five such periods of time as separate a man from his great-grandfather. We speak sometimes of the 'evolution of Christianity,' as if Christianity were something coeval with the geologic periods. But the fact is that though there has been a great deal of activity in theological speculation under the name of Christianity, there has been very little evolution of Christianity itself since the days of Jesus of Nazareth and Paul of Tarsus. However that may be, we need to realize that Christianity appeared in the full light of comparatively recent historical times, and was founded by an historical person of whom we have fairly definite records and under conditions that we may pretend to understand. And if there are some things about the origin of Christianity that we do not know or understand, it is not because of the remoteness of the times, but because of the obscurity and the literary insignificance of its beginnings. The men who launched it were plain men, and we cannot know what they failed to observe and in after years omitted to set down. Yet they set down enough to enable us to study intelligently the circumstances and conditions un-

¹ This paper by the late Professor Arnold was read as the Opening Address at the Harvard Theological School, September 24, 1929. It had originally constituted one of a course of Lowell Lectures, given in King's Chapel, Boston, in December 1909.

der which Christianity arose and to which in so large part it owed its rise.

I say in large part, for Christianity was not a blind product, but was the product of a personality acting upon an historical situation. That historical situation we may measurably understand and account for; if our sources of information are only ample enough, we may understand it completely. But the personality of the founder we shall never wholly understand: there is something bafflingly mysterious about the personality of any man, and this same mystery attaches in superlative degree to the divinest of all men.

The question of personality is one for theological or for psychological speculation; the question of external conditions in reacting upon which the personality finds itself is one for historical investigation. It is merely with this last that we are concerned.

Jesus himself said, "I came not to destroy, but to fulfil." And Christianity did not claim to be a new and independent religion. It professed itself a new phase of an existing ancient faith. Jesus was a Jew, always remained a member of the Jewish communion, and never thought of being anything else. In fact, if Jesus had been a theologian instead of a carpenter, and an author instead of a prophet, his contribution to the thought and life of the world might have appeared in the form of a book, and would have borne the title, 'The Essence of Judaism.' Instead of writing on it, he lived it and preached it. But to understand him as well as we may, we must realize that to his own mind what he lived and preached was not a detached programme of life of his own invention and set over against the religion of his time and people, but was something which he himself professed to single out from the complex heritage of his time and people as the one thing to which all else should be subordinated. The Gospel was to Jesus the Essence of Judaism. It may be hard for some of us to realize, in spite of our knowledge of history, that the name and properly speaking the thing called 'Christianity' did not exist in Jesus' day, and that he considered his religion plain Judaism.

But we must be careful not to misinterpret the term Judaism,

when applying it to the days of Jesus. The Judaism of those days was not the religion of the Old Testament, nor yet was it what we today know as Judaism. It would be extremely difficult to conceive of such a movement as Christianity originating in what we know as Judaism today. The Judaism of the days of Jesus could produce such a movement as Christianity precisely because it was a very complex thing, a seething mass of very varying ingredients, a ferment of opinions and attitudes and speculations. Christianity is a precipitate of Judaism, the live product of live opposing forces. There had been a time, some centuries earlier, when the question as to what was the true religion of Israel and what were its essential requirements was quite definitely settled. That was in the days of Ezra and Nehemiah. And again in later times, a century or two after Christ, perfect unanimity of opinion was reached as to the content and the essence of true Judaism — the days of the supremacy of Rabbinism. But in the days of Jesus the old unity had been shattered and the new had not been achieved.

Christianity is a precipitate of the Judaism of the days of Christ, and the first step toward the historical understanding of its beginnings is to realize the complex character of the Judaism of the times. To say nothing of the millions of Jews who resided outside the bounds of Palestine, scattered throughout the Roman empire, whose views of the world could not help being colored by the systems of Greek thought, whether they completely and correctly understood those systems or not (and of these the Apostle Paul is an example), Palestinian Judaism, in which Christianity arose, was itself by no means a homogeneous thing. How complicated it was may be seen from the fact that a true picture of the religious conditions of the time is not to be derived from any writing that has been preserved in the Jewish church. The later process of simplification involved the repudiation of all manner of compromising and discarded writings. Judaism preserves the Old Testament and the Talmud; but neither the one nor the other gives so accurate a picture of the religious conditions in Palestine as do the books of the New Testament. I refer not to the express statements of the New Testament, for those may be partisan or colored, but

to the underlying situation which the writers involuntarily and necessarily betray, what they assume rather than state. The books of the New Testament are of course rather one-sided in their interpretation of certain phenomena of Judaism; but the phenomena themselves are truthfully portrayed.

The actual faith of the Jews in the time of Jesus had travelled far beyond the narrow confines of the Old Testament religion. The Old Testament was, it is true, the Bible of the Jewish church, but even in that respect we may note the unsettled state of the Judaism of the time. For the actual bounds of the Old Testament were unsettled; new books were being added to the list of sacred writings; and there was still dispute as to just what books were included in this list. In addition, Esther, Song of Songs, Chronicles, in some quarters even Ezekiel, were questioned. Nevertheless, as a class the books of the Old Testament, whether they comprised more or less, were considered sacred and inspired, they were the Bible of the Jewish church. But in order to be of the sacred scriptures of a people, a book must either be old or at least must be thought old. And as a matter of fact all the books of the Old Testament were the product of a former age, and so do not actually represent the religion of the times — any more than the books of the New Testament represent the religion of our own times. We may think they do, but they do not; and so the Jews of the time of Christ thought that their religion was set forth in the books of the Old Testament; but no book can exhibit more than the religion of the age in which it is written.

The religion of the Old Testament books lacked many elements and developments that had been added by the time of Jesus. Since the days of Ezra and Nehemiah the conquests, first of Alexander and then of the Romans, had broken down the ancient political barriers, and with these had done away with the exclusiveness and independence of the old national faiths. These conquests had resulted in the introduction of ideas and conceptions not merely from the Greek and Western world; even more effectively they had mingled and amalgamated the people of the East itself, so that it was under Greek rule that for the first time Babylonian and Persian materials

found extensive acceptance among the Jews of Palestine. For the Greek conquests had achieved something which all the transportations and captivities of the Assyrians and Babylonians had failed to do, and which the mere administrative unity introduced by Persia did not attain — the actual obliteration of old national and racial lines. In the thought of the people of the time of Christ there was a stranger admixture of old Hebrew with foreign ideas and conceptions than had ever been known before — or has ever existed since side by side in an undigested and unharmonized state. Babylonian notions concerning the world of nature, of the heavens, the earth, and the waters under the earth, the mythological beings that inhabited the several spheres; Persian doctrines of the division of all living things into two rival camps, that of the evil spirits and that of the good, waging continual warfare against each other, and of the day of judgment at the end of the world; Greek ideas, in vague and contaminated form, of the paramount worth of the individual and the necessary universality of the true faith. All these ideas had filtered in, not through interracial lecture-ships or the migration of scholars, but through the channels of trade, and so were necessarily characterized by superficiality, inaccuracy, and confusion. The result of all this was that the speculations of Jewish religious thought in the time of Jesus were far ahead of the acknowledged religious standards of the day. The result was also that no matter how strictly national a certain question might be (such as that of the kingdom of God and the Messiah), the materials with which it was combined in the discussions of the time were of the most varied and exotic character, and it was inevitable that the very employment of these materials should color even the most national question with an international and universalistic shading.

As the material of the religious thought of the times was a varied, complicated, and unstable quantity, derived from all manner of sources, so the attitude toward much of it was by no means uniform and identical throughout the Jewish community. I have already called attention to the fact that the religion portrayed for us in the Talmud (edited from 200 A.D. to 500 A.D.) must not be assumed to represent exactly the religion

of the Jews in the time of Christ. In fact, taken as whole, the religion of the Talmud does not represent exactly the religion of even one section of the Jewish people in the time of Christ; it represents the religion of the successors of the scribes and Pharisees, rather than that of the scribes and Pharisees themselves. For rabbinical Judaism is the Judaism of the opponents of Christianity as that Judaism took shape after the conflict with Christianity. At all events, it represents the conquest of a party, a faction — that of the scribes of the gospels. In the days of Jesus, Judaism was by no means so compact and coherent a thing as it became after the Roman wars of the first and second centuries after Christ, the destruction of Jerusalem, the expulsion or secession of Christianity, the extinction of the Sadducees on the one hand and of hellenistic Judaism on the other. In the days of Jesus there were recognized factions and sects within the Jewish community which would have been less congenial to the Judaism of a later day than Christianity itself. The 'Christianity' of Jesus had much more in common with the religion of the Pharisees than it had with that of the Sadducees or with the rationalism of many hellenistic Jews. Jesus was not rebelling against a universally received form of Judaism. There was no such universally received form. The compact thing we know as orthodox Judaism did not exist at that time; what subsequently became orthodox Judaism was in his day but one, although the strongest, of a number of movements or tendencies within the pale of Judaism.

As we have said, partly as the result of their contact with other races and religions and partly as the result of their political experiences during the interval, the Jews had travelled a long distance away from the simple Judaism of Ezra and Nehemiah. Some travelled fast; some travelled slowly; some refused to travel any distance at all. Those who refused to travel any distance at all — whom we may call the extreme right wing — were the Sadducees. They occupied in the Jewish community of the time of Christ the position which the House of Lords occupies in the England of our day. They were the aristocracy, the moneyed class, who had everything to gain by leaving things as they were and everything to lose by changes

of any sort; they wanted no innovations and no disturbances, whether of religion, of the market, of property, or of vested rights. They were the priests, whom the Levitical law, codified late in the fifth century B.C., provided for comfortably and abundantly. They had no objections to the theoretical anticipation of a happier time than the nation enjoyed at present, entertaining a utopian dream for the future; but for themselves they preferred a bird in the hand to two in the bush — utopia might be indefinitely postponed for all they cared. As for the new beliefs — resurrection after death, judgment-day, eternal punishment and eternal reward, paradise, hell, supermundane Messiah, together with the whole apparatus of angels and archangels, spirits, demons, devils, cosmological catastrophes, calculated aeons, and what not, they looked down upon all this as the silly tattle of the superstitious and credulous multitude or as mere labels for the theological inventions of the learned.

At the diametrically opposite end of the line from the Sadducees or conservative men of the world were the Pharisees. This word is commonly held by modern scholars to mean the 'Separatists' — those who separated themselves from other men as more devout and holy than the generality of Jews. But the more probable interpretation of the word is the 'Scrupulous,' those who distinguished minutely in the case of the most trivial act between what is lawful and what is unlawful. Their name accordingly is derived from their attitude toward the law and its observance, but they differed from the sect of the Sadducees in very much more than their attitude toward the law. Their scrupulous and enthusiastic observance of the law was in fact only the corollary of a whole system of belief and teaching which they zealously propagated. In their doctrines they were the antithesis of the Sadducees. They accepted all the beliefs we have just enumerated which the Sadducees rejected. It was the teachings of these Pharisees of the time of Christ that later became dominant in Judaism, their teachings both as to faith and as to practice. The religion of the orthodox Jew of today differs from that of the Pharisees of the time of Christ only as time must needs make it differ.

Briefly their doctrine may be summarized as follows. The

God of the whole world chose the Israelitish people to be the special object of his favor; that they might receive and retain his favor he revealed to them his holy law, the embodiment of his will; that law is contained not only in the five books of Moses, not even with the other books of the Old Testament (the Prophets and the Writings) added, but quite as much in the oral tradition of the elders, which supplemented the written law of Moses in such fashion that every conceivable human act or circumstance was provided for and controlled by an injunction expressed or implied in the law of God. By obedience to this law, Israel secures the favor of God, which is manifested in the temporal prosperity of the nation, if not always of the individual, and in any event in the eternal welfare of the individual. If the nation suffers political humiliation, that is because it is failing to carry out all the law of God; and the only remedy is to be still more observant and obedient, and still more scrupulous. There will come a time, however, when the good deeds of the righteous will merit the grace and favor of God; then he will deliver his people and put all the rest of mankind under their feet. Those Israelites who have had the misfortune to die before that happy day, if individually righteous, will be raised from their graves for a fresh lease of terrestrial life, that they may enjoy the blessings of the messianic age. For this restoration of God's people is to be achieved under the leadership of a king of Davidic descent — God's anointed one, his Messiah, or Christ. All this is to take place in the ordinary history of the world — not in heaven, just as Persia supplanted Babylonia, and Greece Persia, and Rome Greece. After the kingdoms of the Babylonian and the Mede and the Persian and the Greek and the Roman, worst hated of all, will come the kingdom of God, that is, of the Jews. The highest duty of the Jew is therefore to observe the law in all its minute ramifications with such faithfulness as to ensure the speedy coming of the kingdom.

In their zeal for elaboration and theologizing the Pharisees seem to have accepted another set of tenets which, though they have no necessary connection with the doctrines just mentioned, are easily confounded with them — their doctrines

concerning the last things, speculations concerning the end of the world. At the end of time there will be awesome manifestations of the power and majesty of God, followed by a universal judgment of all men, after which the righteous will be transferred to paradise and the wicked sentenced to eternal torment in hell — ideas which have no necessary connection with the old messianic and prophetic hope for the nation.

Now the Pharisees and Sadducees represent the two extremes. But we must not think of these two parties as consisting of a definite membership, with constitution, by-laws, and creed, or platform. The only body of that sort which existed at that time that we know of was the sect of the Essenes, who, because of the very fact that they were a closed corporation, exerted little influence upon the life of the nation. The bounds of Pharisees and Sadducees were tolerably vague, vaguer even than those of our own political parties; a man might be a quasi-pharisee, or again he might be a Pharisee of the Pharisees. And outside the recognized limits of these associations there were all shades of opinion and all degrees of practice, reaching from one extreme to the other. The great mass of the people may properly be described as occupying a middle position — not in the sense that they believed about half of what the Pharisees did and repudiated the other half, or that they stood half-way between the Pharisees and the Sadducees in their religious observances, but in this sense, that they assented in a general way to the theories of the Pharisees, while unable to follow their practice and making no serious attempt to do so. Of such were the Galileans, among whom Jesus came and taught. We must remember, first, that the Pharisees are a small minority superlatively embodying a certain tendency of thought and practice in the Judaism of Jesus' day but neither officially nor unofficially in control of the situation. They may be opposed both in public and in private with perfect impunity; any man's opinion is as good as theirs; there is no law to prevent anyone's gainsaying them — except mob law, which can prevent anything upon occasion. And, secondly, that such authority as still rested with the Jewish community itself, principally in the management of its own religious af-

fairs, was largely in the hands of the opponents of the Pharisees, namely the Jerusalem nobility or Sadducees, who respected only the law of Moses, as contained in the Pentateuch, and, save as its infringement threatened to interfere with their rights and prerogatives, did not take that law too seriously. It was by these Sadducees that Jesus was put to death and precisely for this reason.

Now it is into the midst of this field of controversy and speculation, lying between the two opposite poles we have described, that Jesus came. And his message was in form a reply to the great religious question of the day: Is there a kingdom of God? When will it appear? And what shall the individual Israelite do to prepare for it — if not to hasten it? Jesus was not a man without a country and without a time. He was a part of his age; he came into public notice in connection with a live Jewish problem, and delivered his message in terms of Jewish thought and in the current language of his surroundings. He attempted to tell his fellow Jews what the true Jew was to believe, and what he must do. He preached the essence of Judaism; for he never doubted that the god of Israel was the one true God.

Putting the matter in this way — which is the way Jesus himself would have put it — we see that we should not expect to find his answer falling outside the bounds of existing Jewish teaching. It was to him a question of what must be emphasized in Jewish thought to the point of sacrificing all else if necessary. Of course, by a mere change of emphasis one may radically alter the character of a system of faith; for after all religion depends not so much upon what you exclude or what you include, as upon what you make central in your system. And Jesus, like all great reformers, probably underestimated his originality in this respect.

Now that which was to be emphasized in Jewish thought and teaching to the point of sacrificing all else if necessary, is identically that which must be emphasized and made paramount in any system of religion or ethics. You may say that the religion of Jesus consists of the universal and eternal elements which Judaism has in common with other faiths. But Jesus approached his truth from the inside of Judaism and not

from the outside. And his message was preached not as a new faith with new conceptions and terminology; rather did his message appear, we may say, incidentally, in the course of his discussion of the questions of the day. It is quite impossible faithfully and historically to represent the thought of Jesus except by adhering to the forms in which it lay in his mind and in which he preached it. To employ the terminology even of Paul is to misunderstand Jesus. Jesus saw the spiritual side of things, but the objects in which he saw it were the existing objects of his environment. The preaching of Jesus was concerned with the hopes and the tasks of his day.

What was his attitude toward these: (1) his attitude to the current doctrine of an approaching kingdom of God, and, incidentally, to the question of the messiahship; and (2) his attitude toward the supposed embodiment of the divine will, the law?

First as to the doctrine of an approaching kingdom of God. Jesus believed firmly in the coming of the kingdom of the God of Israel. No Pharisee living, no apocalyptic visionary ever took more seriously the doctrine that the existing state of the world was to be supplanted by one in which God's rule should be recognized and the government of this world should conform to the will and the decree of God alone. More than that, he believed, with John the Baptist, that the kingdom was to be ushered in with no great delay. And like John the Baptist he called upon his compatriots and contemporaries to make haste to prepare themselves, lest the kingdom should come upon them unawares and they should be unprepared to share its blessings. But what were the blessings of the kingdom of God? It was here that his doctrine diverged from the prevalent view. Yet even here the divergence consisted in a shifting of emphasis rather than in the substitution of one thing for another. To Jesus the kingdom of God might comprise many things besides — he did not undertake to say what — but of one thing in particular and essentially it should consist. It would be a time and a domain in which the holy will of the holy God should be done as it is in God's own house in heaven. It was to be a reign of righteousness upon this earth. To this end the unrighteous

must be destroyed; they would not be permitted to dim the lustre or stain the purity of the kingdom of God. To allow them to remain would be to defeat the kingdom, to continue the present reign of conflict between good and evil. Hence Jesus' insistent exhortation to repent before it was too late.

Now the current view likewise looked toward a kingdom of God, in which righteousness should prevail and the will of God have undisputed sway. But in the current view it was part and parcel, if indeed it was not the principal part, of the holy will of God that Israel should be restored to a glorious temporal kingdom surpassing in power and splendor even the great empire of the Romans. Righteousness was to be included in the restoration, because Israel was to have all good things and righteousness is a good thing to have; moreover righteousness was a condition of the manifestation of God's special favor to Israel, and of course God must insist on the condition. To Jesus these phases were more than reversed. He gave no thought whatever to the temporal aspect of the matter — it was an aspect in which a man had no business to be interested. He centered all his hopes and based all his struggles on the moral. The kingdom of God was a kingdom of Israel only if and so far as Israel was synonymous with righteousness. Furthermore, he looked forward to a kingdom in which the sufferings of humanity should cease because the wrongs of the world would cease. And whereas the message of John the Baptist, which was preached to the proud and self-satisfied aristocracy of Judaea, was a threatening and terrifying one, Jesus' message to the poor and sick and lowly of Galilee was a message of comfort and hope, a message of Good News, the Gospel.

But, though Jesus had this view of the constitution and the conditions of the kingdom of God, we must not make the mistake of supposing that he considered it a purely spiritual kingdom and already present, so far as it ever could be, in the hearts of his believers. The sons of the kingdom are ready for it; when it comes, they will abide while others are destroyed; but the kingdom itself is something distinctly future — a society in which there shall be none but the fit and holy. If Jesus actually spoke the words recorded in Luke 17, 20, they

must be interpreted in the light of all the rest of his teaching to mean, 'The kingdom will be upon you before you know it.' In this respect Jesus shared the views of his time. The conception of a purely spiritual kingdom, consisting of those who are fit here and now, is altogether too Greek for a Palestinian Jew; he would have had difficulty in conceiving even of a church so ideally composed, to say nothing of the kingdom itself, which is not the church, but what the church exists to bring about.

Now if this is all there is to the kingdom of God, or even if this is what the kingdom is principally, there is no reason why it should be limited to Jews, or why Israel should have any special preference in it. That is, Jesus' view of the kingdom of God is fundamentally incompatible with Jewish exclusiveness and cannot be reconciled with the Jewish national expectations. But to say this is very far from saying that Jesus actually encountered this question and consciously decided it according to the logic and equities of the case. He appears to have left it undecided for the simple reason that he was not confronted with it; he had no occasion to decide it. Both he and his audiences were Jews, and it is questionable whether he ever came in contact with a gentile who was not some sort of an adherent of Judaism until he faced Pontius Pilate in the judgment hall. Both Jesus and his audiences were Jews, and the question of the place of the gentiles in this scheme would have been purely academic. Perhaps he may have shared the common assumption that the gentiles would be converted to the true faith — and of course the true faith was *his* faith.

We come then to the second great question: What is the will of God, the doing of which prepares a man for the kingdom of God? Is it identical with the law? What shall a man do to inherit eternal life? Now if there was one answer that Jesus certainly did not give to this question, it was this: 'Believe that I, Jesus of Nazareth, sustain an extraordinary, superhuman relation to God and you will be fitted to participate in the kingdom of God.' To Jesus, as to his Jewish contemporaries, the condition imposed by God for salvation was not an intellectual one — if indeed deliberate assent to any dogma can be described as an intellectual act. It had regard, in good old Jewish fashion,

to conduct; to do the will of the Father was his way of expressing it. But what is that will? Is it identical with the Pentateuch, as the Sadducees held? Or is it more extensive, as in the opinion of the Pharisees? Or is it something which has been obscured by both the one and the other of these learned parties? At first sight it might seem that Jesus allied himself in this case with the Sadducees against the Pharisees, as in the case of the doctrine of the future life he allied himself with the Pharisees against the Sadducees. Time and again he spoke with utmost contempt of 'the tradition of men,' which the diligence of the scribes had heaped upon the law of God, that is, the law of Moses. To the scribes who inquired after the way to eternal life, he replied (Luke 10, 25-28), "What is written in the law? This do and thou shalt live." And there can be no doubt that in general Jesus followed all the prescriptions of the law of Moses. More even than this is probable. He probably conformed to many of the requirements of the oral law as well. For we must remember that the Jewish law, whether oral or written, was separated by no hard and fast line from the customs of the people; the laws made customs, and customs made the laws. And Jesus no doubt observed the conventions and usages of respectable society whenever there was no higher object to be served by disregarding them. Nevertheless, the essential point is not whether or not he conformed to or departed from a particular law, but what *importance* he came to attach to the law. And here he was very far removed from the rabbis of his time. The absolute submission to the letter of the law, as something in and of itself sacred without regard to the object of God in prescribing it, Jesus plainly repudiated, not merely in the case of the extra-canonical law of the scribes, but also with regard to the written law of Moses, whenever a particular law fell below the level of the demands of his moral sense or collided with it. When it came to an issue, he dared to speak with authority and not as the scribes, although he ordinarily had little occasion to take issue with the law of Moses. The law of God, though embodied in a general way in the law of Moses — that it is so even we today will not deny — was to him a thing of life, not of manifold precepts. It consists not in

external conformity, though this will generally follow; it consists in the attuning of the spirit itself to the will and the purpose of God. It is to be found — the whole of it — expressed in the two commandments, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; and thy neighbor as thyself." When the special stipulations of the law of Moses traversed this highest commandment, he did not hesitate to question even their authority. God has regard to the motive, not to the deed alone; to the heart, not merely to the performance. Thus in principle Jesus' teaching was opposed to both the Sadducees and the Pharisees: it was not a question of much or little that was to be done or left undone, but a question of why it was done or left undone. Whatever is dictated by love to God or man is the will of God.

Now here too we have a thought by no means unknown to Jewish teaching. It was a thought of the prophets of the Old Testament, and echoes of it are not wanting in the Jewish teaching of the time of Christ. But Jesus did what his contemporaries did not do: he singled this out and made it the burden of all his teaching. He did not merely say that this injunction contained all the law and the prophets; he left the rest of the law and the prophets severely alone and worked only with this principle. Like the kingdom of God, God's law has nothing to do with externals; it is moral and involves the personality itself. Accordingly Jesus' teaching differed from the teaching of the scribes not so much by what it contained as by what it neglected. It brought man face to face with what is the essential element of righteousness in man, because it brought him face to face with that which is righteousness in God.

There remains the question of the place which Jesus assigned to himself in the economy of the kingdom of God. Was he merely one of a multitude working in the vineyard of the Lord, or did he occupy a unique place in God's plan of the kingdom? What was his attitude toward the Messiahship?

This is an historical question which has not been satisfactorily answered. The sources of our information are the first three gospels, all written by men who were convinced that

Jesus was the Messiah promised of God. No one of these gospels — not even Mark — follows a strictly chronological order in the arrangement of its narrative and materials; and all three evangelists wrote long after the death of Jesus, when the Christian conception of the character and function of the Messiah, as well as of the ancient Scriptures that related to his coming, had been profoundly influenced and modified by that very death of Jesus. How far, therefore, the later developed opinion was occasioned by the sayings of Jesus himself during his lifetime, is an extremely difficult question. There can be little doubt that all three of the evangelists have read, not so much into the substance — for where an author is perfectly sincere, he will rarely succeed in changing the substance — but into the form of the sayings of Jesus, expressions which came into use only during the early years of the church after Jesus was dead and had ascended into heaven. Jesus may have spoken of himself as the 'Son of man,' though many scholars dispute it; but he certainly did not habitually so speak of himself, and the cases still exist where a later evangelist had substituted the term 'Son of man' for the plain 'I' of an earlier gospel.

Some scholars, pointing out that the office which Jesus actually filled had nothing to do with the functions of the Messiah as pictured in the language and ideas of the time, question whether Jesus ever identified himself with the Messiah expected by the Jews. But the real question here at issue is this: whether Jesus really conceived himself to occupy a unique position in the plan of God regarding the kingdom of Heaven. If he did, then the fact that his life had in it none of the elements of the popular conception of the Messiah is not to the point; for his conception of the kingdom of Heaven had little in common with the current view. His kind of kingdom of Heaven could hardly be expected to carry with it the Messiah of the popular imagination. And if he was content to make use of the current terminology in the case of the kingdom, there is no reason why he should not have done so in the case of the messiahship — always assuming that he conceived himself to occupy a unique place in the divine economy — for there could be but one Messiah. Now that he did conceive that he occu-

pied a unique place in the divine economy hardly admits of any doubt. The only question is as to the time when this conviction was borne in upon him — whether at the beginning of his ministry or at a certain definite point of time toward the end of his ministry, in the episode referred to in Mark 8, 27. It seems on the whole more probable that the conviction had been gradually forming in his mind shortly before that episode at Caesarea Philippi. At any rate there can be no doubt that he then for the first time admitted, rather than announced, the fact of his messiahship to his disciples. This was toward the end of his ministry, shortly before his journey to Jerusalem, where he was put to death. To the conclusion that he was the promised Messiah he was apparently led by the increasing realization of the purely moral character of the kingdom. If the kingdom is to consist of those who do the will of God, then is the Messiah, who ushers in that kingdom, that man in whom there is for the first time a conscious realization of perfect accord with the will of God. The demonstrator in his own life and person of the true messianic doctrine is the true Messiah. The finder and the bearer of the true gospel of salvation, the revealer of the love of God, the reclamer of the lost, the comforter of the disconsolate, the healer of the sick, is the true Messiah, the true agent of the kingdom of God. It is not improbable that Jesus was influenced in reaching this view of his unique relation to the Father by the very fact of the existence of the Jewish doctrine of the Messiah, which provided for but one such divine agent. Apparently he was conscious of himself being that one.

Why, with this conception of the true messiahship, he should have allowed himself to be acclaimed as the Messiah of the popular imagination at his entry into Jerusalem — or indeed why he should have gone to Jerusalem at all, when as the records clearly show, he anticipated the collision with the authorities which resulted in his death — these are questions relating to the motives of Jesus which we cannot answer.

Of one fact, however, we may be certain. It was no part of the Gospel of Jesus that his own death was required by God as a penalty for the sins of mankind.

It is evident from this brief sketch of the cardinal points in Jesus' teaching that they were, for all their heterodoxy, not nearly so remote from the current Jewish ideas of the time as are the doctrines of the church which bears his name.

If now we ask how it is that the church which professes to follow in his footsteps so soon built up a whole system of doctrine alien to himself, we shall find our answer in this single fact. The religious example of Jesus remained the ideal of his followers; his conception of the fatherhood and love of God, of the essence of the divine law, of man's redemption through love and self-sacrificing service, of the kingdom of God as the goal of all human endeavor, remained the treasured possession of the Christian church; but for that very reason the Christian church was bound to do for him and with him what he could not do for himself. The specific doctrine of Christianity, as distinguished from anything that the Judaism of Jesus had or could contain, is its christology — its theory of Christ and of his place in the kingdom of God and in the divine plan for the realization of that kingdom. The christology of the church was based, not upon the life of Jesus, but upon his death. His death on the cross was the one great problem of the early church; it took precedence even over the doctrine and the problem of the kingdom. How came it that the Messiah of God — if indeed he was that — should have been abandoned to an ignoble death upon the cross? How was the cross to be turned into a victory instead of a defeat, a demonstration instead of a refutation? The definitive answer to this question was given by Paul. It is Paul who formulates the doctrine which has controlled the Christian church that not the life of Christ was his paramount contribution to the salvation of the world, nor yet his preaching or his teaching, but his death and resurrection. Instead of apologizing for Christ's death, or explaining it, Paul boldly adopts it as the necessary step in the salvation of mankind and so as the condition of the appearance of the kingdom of Heaven. With the Pauline theology Christianity abandons the sphere of Jewish thought and teaching. It is no longer a question of emphasis; the Pauline theology is something entirely new and something entirely unjewish. The doc-

trine of the salvation of men through faith in the person of Jesus Christ and the efficacy of his suffering was doubtless provoked by Jewish opposition and Jewish prejudice; but to meet the attack Paul went clear outside the breastworks of Jewish thought and speculation. Paul was a Pharisee, trained in Jerusalem at the feet of Gamaliel, but he spoke and read and wrote Greek well, and was born in Tarsus in Asia Minor. His doctrine of the person of Christ had in it something of the mystical and the sacramental; it was far more congenial to the Greek than it ever could be to the Jew. Judaism had, and has, no sacraments. Paul's abandonment of the Jewish law was less repugnant to Jewish modes of thought than was his christology; for the condemnation of that ceremonial law was quite in the spirit of Jesus and even of certain of the Old Testament prophets; Jesus would almost certainly have repudiated that law if he had been confronted with Paul's problem. But Paul's christology is something that we cannot with any stretch of the imagination conceive of Jesus as assenting to or even understanding.

Nevertheless, in spite of the Pauline theology, and in spite of its repudiation of the Jewish ceremonial law, the Christian church never succeeded in breaking with the fact of its Jewish origin. After Paul the Christian church still preached the God of the Old Testament — in spite of repeated attempts to persuade it to disregard Him; it still accepted the books of the Old Testament as the word of God; it made the Jewish synagogue the model for its churches and assemblies; and in its services and worship the Jewish worship in scripture-reading, preaching, prayer, and praise was adopted and retained. Better than all, the Jewish morality was rigidly taught and nobly exemplified, to the unbounded admiration of the heathen world.

SOME ASPECTS OF OUR PURITAN INHERITANCE

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AN IMPRESSIVE thing is happening in these days. We are observing the Tercentenary of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The common verdict has been for a long time rather against the Puritans. Their civil administration is declared to have been at times tyrannical, their ecclesiastical order prejudiced, even bigoted. Individuals among them appear to us fanatical. Such accusations have become almost traditional. At the present moment however the mind of our country and in some measure of the world has turned again to the contemplation of the Puritan history. We recall their deeds and suffering. It is realized how one-sided is the judgment alluded to. There is a disposition to recognize how great was their service to our country and to modern men. This is the mind of some who by no means share the solemn earnestness, the rigidity, the zealotry of the typical Puritan character. Perhaps no generation of our countrymen has ever been further removed than is our own from Puritan standards. Yet there is this widespread feeling that justice is not always done them. We may owe to them something of the larger liberty and more comfortable existence which, coming generations after them, we now enjoy and which apparently we might not have enjoyed had we lived among them.

There is a common root of some even of the most divergent estimates, namely, insufficient knowledge of history. We should not in enthusiasm attribute to them all the virtues that we can imagine. There is likely to be reaction when it is discovered that there are important virtues, like tolerance, which they did not possess. On the other hand, it is depressing to those who know that the Puritans had high virtues to hear about nothing except their faults. It is positively misinforming to those who know nothing of them to be told of nothing but their vices. It may be safely assumed that there was a great deal of human

nature in them, and furthermore that they were children of their own times. History would teach us what were the prevailing standards of their times. The Puritans' own writings, for example Winthrop's Journal, would show us how far they were in accord with the standards, political, social, and religious, of their times. We should thus also be put in the way of finding out how far and in what notable particulars they transcended the standards of their times. It must be to this latter element that their fame and influence, after three hundred years, is mainly due. Incontrovertibly this influence has been so great that their faults might almost be looked upon as incidental.

Were one asked to speak solely upon the topic of religious liberty in the Bay Colony under the first charter, he might do so rather briefly. He might say that in the sense in which we use that phrase, religious liberty, there was none. It does not follow that religious liberty has not grown out of the burning zeal for rightness, the religious and moral earnestness which possessed the best of the Puritans. Religious liberty did thus grow out of their solemn, if you choose abnormal, earnestness, but it was in composition with other religious earnestnesses which were but reluctantly recognized as having equal justification with their own. It grew out of contradictions and contrarities of religious views and practices which our fathers feared and were determined to exclude. The friction was good for them. It was good also for their opponents, although neither of them thought so. You might say that the Puritans had religion and little liberty. The case would not have been different had any one of their main opponents, for example, the Established Church, been able to seize the authority. It is almost a jest to say that these latter were seeking religious liberty. They were seeking religious liberty in the same sense in which the Puritans had found it. One should reflect upon the remark of one of them, out of reach in New Hampshire, written in a letter to the government of England, that there would be no loyalty here until Harvard College was suppressed. We might say, on the other hand, that we have intense libertarianism and are not overwhelmed with religion. Even the liberty not to have any

religion has arrived, in due time, and very rightly so. Still, you cannot adequately speak of religious liberty if all that you mean is the liberty not to have any religion. You cannot adequately speak of civil liberty if all you mean is the liberty not to have any civil order and to combat any civil order which exists. Whatever that is, it is not liberty.

Many and various things have been said about the Puritans in these months. Many more will be said before the year is out. We shall not discuss Roger Williams or Anne Hutchinson or President Dunster, or the Quakers and Mary Dyer. One could discuss all of these with real sympathy — for both sides — except perhaps that we should have little sympathy with the opponents of Dunster. We may more profitably confine ourselves to a few considerations — four I have in mind — all more or less closely related and three of which, at least, seem to lie a little outside the lines which a good part of the general discussion is likely to take.

The first of these points which we do well to recall is that the Puritan movement in this country was only a part of a much larger and more dramatic whole. The movement in England had begun more than a generation before the migration to these shores. There must have been scores or even hundreds of men of like mind who remained behind for every one who came to New England in the early years. A tremendous conflict rent the mother country all the years of the struggle of Winthrop and his colleagues to maintain their ascendancy here. Besides being religious the struggle was far more frankly civil in the mother country than here. Puritans who profoundly loved their country, and many of whom deeply loved the Established Church, felt not merely that the right of obedience to conscience in matters of religion was being denied them. They felt also that civil rights long since accorded to Englishmen were being taken from them. Already the hand of Elizabeth had been heavy upon dissenters as well as upon Roman Catholics. Men of learning and station as well as of piety had set great hopes upon James. They were soon undeceived. The conflict with Charles was severer still. The fate of Sir John Eliot and his Petition of Right shows that. This was the year before the

settlement of Boston. The possibility of misunderstanding at this point of the relation of Puritanism in England to the beginnings in this country may be illustrated by a tale told by a distinguished Oxford scholar lecturing at Harvard only a few months since. A graduate student — the visitor told with visible embarrassment whence the graduate came — arrived in Oxford and was lunching with the hospitable Principal. Casual mention was made of Puritans, apropos perhaps of the line of an earthwork thrown up by Charles against the Parliamentary army, a line which runs directly through the college grounds. The youth exclaimed, "Puritans! Why, did you have them here too?"

The Pilgrims had been real 'come-outers.' They harked back to Browne and Barrow. They were for "reform without tarrying for any." They went to Holland, and eventually came to Plymouth in 1620. They were simple people. The terms of their investors at home were almost fatal. The colony remained small. They were ultimately merged with the Bay Colony. By 1630, however, matters in the homeland had gone so far that a much larger number of men of a very different attitude of mind, a notable proportion of them men of university training, not a few of them men of property, some of them not without experience in government, had, for the time at least, lost hope of the success of their cause in England. Numbers of them came to Salem and Charlestown and Watertown and Boston and became the founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The poignant expressions of their reluctance, of their love of their country and of its church, are never to be forgotten. There seemed, however, to be no chance then in England of a more scriptural church or of a juster and freer state. The Company at home, the New England Company, secured the ever memorable charter from King Charles which is dated 1629. Winthrop and his friends exacted of the Company, as the condition of their putting their property into the venture and coming to these shores at all, the concession that they, on the spot, were to be the government. The Company so constituted twelve of them. If presently they erected defenses against the possible effort of the king's government to coerce them in the

sense of its policy in the homeland, it needs no saying that within the Colony itself they regarded themselves as the government as against dissenting opinions or rebellious practices.

By 1640 — it is curious how the history runs in decades — the Civil War had broken out. The stream of men of like mind with themselves ceased almost in a moment to come to these shores. Numbers of the best in the Colony went back. These were now animated by the hope of accomplishing, on a far larger scale in the homeland, that of which they had despaired when they came hither. Despite the disturbances, the investors at home were combing the country for emigrants upon whom their profits would depend. Apart from these, less fortunate persons of every sort may also have come. The population of England, still largely agricultural, had by no means reached the point where skilled and responsible tillers of the soil were leaving the country for the sake of land. If, however, there were twenty thousand people here by 1640 — which is hard to believe — there must have been many of a different mind from the earlier Puritans themselves. There must have been a real necessity for government. By another decade, 1650, at home the Parliamentarians had triumphed, Strafford and Laud and at last the king had been beheaded, the House of Lords had been abolished, the Church disestablished. Independency had been acknowledged. The Westminster Confession had been adopted, only to be soon discarded by the English, perhaps in part because it was so satisfactory to the Scotch. Puritanism was ominously triumphant. By another decade, 1660, Parliaments, the Rump, the Barebone, and the Parliaments of the Protectorate, had run through their brief. If they had defended England against a military dictatorship, Cromwell had protected England against the bigotry and nonsense of a representative government which had ceased to represent anything. Democracy had been tried and found wanting. Cromwell was dead. There was nothing for it but to take refuge in the monarchy, to call Charles, to reestablish the Church, and to begin again, it must be confessed, a régime of oppressions which the Puritan oppression had done its best to call forth. Finally, in 1689, the Parliament declared the

throne vacant. The Stuarts vanished. William and Mary ruled, in such enlightenment and liberality as they could, over a people who had, in some measure at least, learned a bitter and salutary lesson.

These things are profoundly instructive to those who would compare them with the course of events in New England in those same years. In England Puritanism had never had time or free space in which to crystallize. It was submerged under the last two Stuarts. It left however a deposit, not alone in religious and moral but also in political and social ways, which has been fundamental in Great Britain ever since, and has become one among the fundamentals of the enlightened nations of the world. In the next half-century, England slowly recovered from the long nightmare which the previous half-century must at times have seemed. Here, on the other hand, in New England, Puritanism did have time and all the space in the world in which to crystallize. Crystals are difficult to dissolve. Even when dissolved their elements do not at once show the fertility of alluvium which has been laid down by flowing rivers or driven back upon shores by recurrent tides. In England one can see that the long-drawn tragedy had been a blessing, even though it had been much disguised. Here Puritanism had been practically supreme. Its supremacy was not good for it. In London Cavaliers and Ironsides jostled one another on the streets. On this side the Cavaliers went to Virginia. After the reputation of the Bay Colony had been once established — it seemed to many to be a reputation for inhospitality — dissidents, even though the area of their dissent was not great, could go elsewhere, for example, even to Connecticut for a milder Puritanism. From both of these colonies, as indeed from others, if dissidents did not of themselves go elsewhere, their departure was regrettably facilitated. There was plenty of wilderness. Here, for a long time free from any serious calling to account on the part of the home government, as also from any effective opposition on these shores, in an isolation which our Puritans, some of them, we may be sure, regarded as a blessing of God and a situation favorable to the purposes, religious, civil, and social, to which they had conscientiously

dedicated themselves, the nemesis of their isolation overtook them. Here there had been no grand battle of two radically opposite theories of government, no agonizing balance of religious forces, no inherited civilization with conflicting rights and privileges bestowed through centuries. Here no civilization had, the whole fabric of it, been shaken to its foundations in a generation of strife. Here there was no forced resolution of obstinate contrarieties — to the distress of mind and also to the political and religious salvation of all parties concerned. Here all the institutions developed upon lines which, for two or three generations, were not greatly changed from those which the zealots and idealists had laid down when first they came to these shores. They were not adequately changed until the necessity arose for the union of the colonies in the War of Independence. The formulation of the change is the Constitution of the United States with its protection of the religious interests of all and the guarantee of religious liberty to all. To be exact, this was in 1789, precisely a century after the accession of William of Orange.

The contrast sketched above is worthy of much consideration. It is not just merely to make merry over the fact that the Puritans sought an isolation which then turned out to be injurious. We do not know that all of them did seek it. They certainly did in decreasing measure attain it. We do know that they were not the only people who, for themselves, desired it. Men of many races and faiths and traditions, perhaps quite naturally, sought the companionship of their kind. Racial feeling was still powerful. After the long religious wars and persecutions in Europe, what we now call sectarianism was much in evidence. As was said before, there was unlimited territory for different groups to occupy. A part of the sectarianism which puzzles foreigners and discourages us is no doubt a survival of the time when the whole country was frontier. On the other hand, with all the evils of isolation, some of which we have dwelt upon, there were advantages, too. This concentration of racial and denominational types made against the too early admixture of blood. It worked for the permanence of intellectual and religious tradition. It diffused a characteristic thrift and

tenacity, so that even some who are not cordial to New England admit that there is to this day a New England which stretches practically from Cape Cod to Puget Sound. In all or most of this significant area there has been a Puritan deposit. It is as if New England men, migrating in such numbers after our Civil War, on discovery of the fertile plains of the Middle West and in the era of the building of the railways, carried some soil with them. They were the soil. It is not too much to say that they, with their congeners at heart, of whatever race and faith, have had great part in the making of our nation and the re-making of the world of our own day.

Perhaps this is a point at which we may appropriately speak of a curious error in judgment rather common concerning the Puritan communities. So much is said of their preternatural gravity, that some seem to have gathered the impression that all Puritans were aged men. The contrary might safely be assumed. After all, they were hardly over the edge of the glorious Elizabethan era of adventure. There was grim adventuring in the hearts of the responsible leaders. Of the joyous and sometimes disconcerting adventurousness of the younger men, we do not hear so much. But in the main, we have to remember that it was the elders who wrote the books. The lions, or at any rate these younger lions, did not paint the pictures. Beyond question, however, they did their share of the epoch-making work, as in navigation, in discovery and in occasional conflict with the Indians, in the whole building up of the economic basis of the commonwealth. It was not a society composed entirely of ministers and magistrates, though laws and ecclesiastical history, with sermons, constitute the bulk of the record which has come down to us. It must have been a much more normal little human world. The size of the families which are mentioned by the ministers — in some cases they were the families of the ministers — in the first decade or two of the settlement suggests something about youth. Carver and Brewster were older men, but Bradford was only thirty-two when he succeeded Carver as governor at Plymouth. It has been said that with exception of the two just named not a soul on the Mayflower was over forty years of age. Winthrop,

indeed, was forty-two when he arrived on the *Arbella* as governor of the Bay Colony. Cotton had preached many years at Boston in England, but was only forty-five on coming here. Roger Williams was born in 1604; John Eliot, the apostle, in the same year; Richard Mather in 1596. Vane was but twenty-four when he became governor for his one brief year, and Dunster is thought to have been but thirty-one when he assumed the presidency of Harvard College. And even these are all of them people who figure in the official pictures. The difficulty must be with our materials. "God's Wonder-Working Providence in New England" and Cotton Mather's "*Magnalia Christi Americana*" do not indeed contain a great deal of the kind of information which we at the moment seek. Economic histories had not yet been invented. Biographies were too much on the model of the lives of the saints. Novels were as good as non-existent. Gray's *Elegy* has found a place in the heart of humanity in part because it deals with people whom nobody knows anything about. This will hardly do for history. These facts set us searching for some source other than those alluded to. Remnants of the sort are scant.

Samuel Niles, born on Block Island in 1674, was the author of a sketch, "The History of the Indian and French Wars." He was the grandson of the James Sandys of whom he has much to say. Perhaps his relationship is responsible for the preservation of a story which we might never have known that we missed. James Sandys is a picturesque figure, a youth of illustrious family, of whom we have real information, who may be said to have made much history without writing any. He spent a year or two in the Bay Colony about the time of Sir Harry Vane, and then moved on to other adventures. He was the grandson of Edwin Sandys, Queen Elizabeth's Archbishop of York, whom Strype describes as "an obstinate and conscientious Puritan." It seems likely that Sandys was the first Archbishop of York to marry. Elizabeth gave drastic expression to her opinion of the marriage of Parker, her Archbishop of Canterbury. The two men were friends. They had been companions in exile, at Strasburg, in the time of Mary Tudor. At Strasburg Sandys had buried his first wife. The archbishop's

second son had been Sir Edwin Sandys, several times member of Parliament, Treasurer and Governor of the Virginia Company, in constant strife with King James. Of him, James once said, "Choose the devil, but not Edwin Sandys." He had two sons who fought under Cromwell, one of whom was killed. George Sandys, the archbishop's seventh son, wrote one of the earliest books of travel in the Orient. His visit to the Holy Sepulchre, mentioned in his "Relation," is said to have moved Milton to write his "Hymn to my Redeemer." The archbishop's sixth son was Henry Sandys, vicar of Groton in Suffolk, clergyman and friend of John Winthrop, who had been lord mayor of Groton.

James Sandys, the son of the vicar, is said by Niles to have given his father cause for anxiety. He seems to have been commended to the care of his father's old friend, John Winthrop, in Boston. If the date of his birth, 1622, on his tomb on Block Island is to be trusted, he would seem to have been only fifteen years old when he came to Boston. His stay was brief. He promptly threw in his lot with Anne Hutchinson and presently followed her to Portsmouth. A little later he seized and made good a claim to Block Island, and set up for an island potentate. He is described as "a man of plentiful estate and given to hospitality." His house on the island was a refuge for his friends on the mainland in times of danger from the Indians, as also in times of divergent opinions such as occurred even in Rhode Island. There church services were held, and thence government was administered. It is said that he had promised to build a house for Anne Hutchinson after her removal to Dutch territory in the neighborhood of New Amsterdam, but he was not present at the time of the massacre. His wife, both on the island and on the mainland, nursed the sick and cared for the needs of women much as Anne Hutchinson had done in Boston. After his death she is said to have freed her slaves. Sandys must have been past middle life when he took part with Mason in the great swamp fight near Kingston, Rhode Island, which ended King Philip's War. Still later, he fired upon Breton fishermen trespassing upon his shores, and a privateer being sent from the North to redress the grievance, in a pitched battle

by land and sea he drove the invader off. It was his custom to gather his family and retainers with, upon occasion, his garrison, for prayers. These redoubtable prayers seem to have remained in the memory of the grandson, who was eleven when his grandfather died. It is not uninteresting to think of a Puritan of this sort, and we have no reason to suppose that the type was altogether exceptional.

The second point had in mind may be treated more briefly. It has often been dealt with. It is that of the view of Scripture characteristic, indeed, of high Protestantism in general in that age, but intensified in the Puritanism of the Colony. This view of the nature and authority of Scripture certainly had something to do with the official attitude toward Quakers and the theory of George Fox. It gave almost unbelievable intensity to the Puritan purposes even in respect of civil government. The Bible was the literal word of God, the absolute light and guide of all the purposes of men. It was the sole authentic declaration concerning the nature and will of God. It was the authoritative setting forth of the purposes of God. Puritans and many others had long contended that the Church must be reformed until it accorded with the word of Scripture. In England, and for a time at least, it had been the contention of some that the State also should be reformed in the same sense. Here, however, the enthusiasts for this view had a free hand for this endeavor. A State was to be constituted. Principles of government according to the will of God were sufficiently made known in the Scriptures. The intention of the most ardent was to establish a scriptural commonwealth, a government of God on earth. Sensitiveness to this purpose was not always absent from the minds even of some who had more experience and a larger view.

A literal view of the Scriptures was held by the large majority even of the learned among Protestants in that time. It was true that Luther had had for a time a more adequate notion. He had held that the truth which the Scripture declares must validate itself in the experience of the devout mind and heart. Of course a man like Erasmus could hold no absolutist view, but Erasmus had remained in the Roman Church. Melanch-

thon saw difficulties. But with Luther's temperament it was all or nothing. Even the Augsburg Confession shows that. One feels the same struggle in the framing of the Articles of the Church of England. For the men, however, who wrote the Westminster Confession and the Form of Government the struggle was over. One has only to note the way in which proof-texts are used to see that. The conflict with the entrenched authority of the Roman Catholic Church, operative practically as an external and unqualified authority, and, equally, the portentous evils which manifested themselves in Protestant circles wherever the doctrine of immediate personal inspiration of the believer was proclaimed, led to the exaltation of the last letter of Scripture as a miraculous external and unqualified authority of God over the whole mind and life of men. No doctrine of heretics and schismatics was more abhorred and feared by the strictly orthodox Protestants of the sixteenth and, mainly, through the seventeenth century, than was any doctrine of the inner light, if this were to weaken, or take the place of, the divine authority of the letter of Scripture. From this point of view the disagreement with Anne Hutchinson was entirely logical. One can think of high examples of dissent. Cromwell wavered in view of the absurdities of the Barebones Parliament. Milton had tragic hours about it. But Cromwell was a man of affairs, faced by indisputable facts, and Milton was a great mind. George Fox is immortal for having elaborated a view which Kant, most probably without knowing anything about it, confirmed. But is it surprising that George Fox, besides going to his beloved Pennsylvania, and although he came even so far as Connecticut, did not visit Boston? "The Bible and the Bible only is the religion of Protestants," Chillingworth had said, and the age acclaimed. Bradford in his old age in Plymouth tried to learn a little Hebrew, in order that, before he should go to the abode of bliss to which he humbly hoped to attain, he might already understand a little of the language of God and the angels. As late as the turn of the eighteenth century, in face of the witchcraft insanity, it was said that the Bible would not mention witches if there were no such people. And if the Bible said, as it does, "Thou shalt not

suffer a witch to live," what might not happen to a community whose magistrates did not live up to their responsibility to God in this regard?

As was said above, all Puritans believed, in theory at least, that the Church of England was to be reformed into strict conformity with the letter of Scripture. It would have been difficult thus to reform the government of England as inherited from Elizabeth and not much amended by James and Charles. That might, however, be viewed as one of the evils of time and place, where the government already had so much compromising history. Calvin had succeeded more nearly in Geneva, but Geneva was small and homogeneous. Knox had succeeded more nearly in Scotland; but the king was a child, the regent was on Knox's side, and the Scotch liked it. Here in the Colony was a clearer field for the great endeavor. Yet Winthrop seems to have had misgivings. He, a Cromwell in the small, without the necessity of being a destroyer, with all opportunity of being a creator, had his moments of doubt, or at least of compromise. He too was in contact with actual facts. Charles Chauncy, Dunster's successor as president of Harvard College, writes: "If the establishing of a Bible Commonwealth was permissible at all, the restriction of civil rights of Freemen in the Colony to members of the recognized churches [that was the subject under discussion], this was the best means which could be devised to carry out the scheme, since it placed the government in the hands of those who were interested in the welfare of the particular church which they came here to nourish." Winthrop, with his eleven associates, had been the author of this strange limitation to church members of the full right to participate in government. It had been at an early and critical juncture in the history of the Colony. It was much disputed even before the Restoration. It was a strange measure. No such thing had been mentioned in the vote of the Company. Still less had it been implied in King Charles's charter. There was no such limitation of franchise for reasons of religion in England, except, indeed, in the case of Roman Catholics, since Elizabeth. If there had been such limitation of franchise, how could there have been a Long Parliament? Yet, with but brief and rather

insignificant intervals, Winthrop was elected annually as governor of the Colony until his death in 1649. More and more, however, as the years go on, one gets the impression from his own frank narrative that it was because he was wise and strong enough to hold the balance between conflicting elements. Perhaps he held that balance within himself. Conjunction of the real piety of his time with sovereign common sense and rational forecast was his own.

There are evidences of the influence of New England upon the England of the Long Parliament. In debates upon the manner of organizing churches, several times mention was made of "the New England way." John Eliot, the apostle to the Indians, in his old age published a book entitled "The Christian Commonwealth." He found the model of the Christian state in the early Hebrew community. From the vantage of that measure of success which he believed was being achieved in this effort here, he recommended its imitation in England in the crisis of 1660. We do not learn that his suggestion found any advocate. It was at once too late and too early. For ourselves, we are quite unable to envisage a biblical commonwealth, and almost as nearly unable to envisage a purely biblical church. The Gospel is a spirit. We put the whole evolution of the Christian church itself, its doctrine, its organization, its ritual, everything pertaining to it, under the angle of historical interpretation of the spirit of the Gospel, adaptations of that spirit to changing needs, and even, at times, to the supposed needs, of successive generations. We take all the risks which go with a strict adherence to the idea of the Gospel as pure spirit, because we have witnessed the recurrent disasters of so many attempts to take it as absolute letter. As for the Law, which figured so largely in the minds of Calvinists in all their ramifications, the Law is not to us the complete expression of an eternal moral obligation. In fact there are chapters of it which are not to us the expression of any obligation at all. There clings to it far too much of the atmosphere, imagined to have been that of the desert (more probably it was that of the later kingdom), and too much also of the nature and circumstance of the Hebrew people for whom it was designed. The author of the Epistle to

the Hebrews said something like that. The Law "was a figure for the time then present." You might say that the Law also was only a spirit from which instruction might be drawn while quite other applications were to be made. Jesus, and the prophets long before him, had said that.

Decidedly, however, this was not the Puritan view. To them, it was a letter, a code, a constitution over and above all other constitutions. It was the charter of the King of kings which, if other charters, as for example the charter of Charles, ignored, the charter of Charles was to be ignored. Here lies apparently the secret of a famous historical fact. It is that of the rebelliousness of Calvinistic states and of their sometimes subversive and at the same time and in the long run creative influence upon the history of mankind. Men, all men alike, were so simply under the sovereignty of God that all other sovereignties might be cheerfully defied. "We ought to obey God rather than men," was the simple formula. They were in error only in supposing that it was far easier to find out what the will of God is than it has ever proved to be. Remnants of this stringent view of Scripture survive among us even today. The only recent instance of an effort legally to enforce the code and validate the tradition connected with it was limited to the teaching of anthropology, and this within only a limited area. A fading sense of obligation to this view survives however among religious people in our own communities, in composition, be it said, with other elements which must in the end prove fatal to it. If we would be just, we must remember that such a view of Scripture existed in its divine simplicity and entirety for the men of whom we speak. The legislation of Sinai was to them as but of yesterday. Not merely that, it was to all eternity and for all humanity. We ought not to wear a superior smile as we think this, or let a childlike pride in recent learning, most of which comes to most of us at second hand, prevent our understanding the effort of these grave men to establish the kingdom of God, at once and in its entirety, in the fortunate scrap of wilderness where there was so little of worldly tradition to prevent.

In the third place, there is something to say about the nature

of the government which the Puritans in this Colony aimed to establish. It is traditional, and, incidentally, it is also true, that beginnings which were then made have exerted great influence upon our whole history and upon the modern world at large in the direction of the development of democracy. We should not, however, be led by this fact to suppose that the Puritan state was or ever intended to be a democracy. Quite the contrary. It was an aristocracy, in the etymological sense of that word, a rule of the best. True, it was in a measure from an aristocracy in the conventional sense, that is, from one based on prescriptive rank, on wealth and privilege, that the Puritans had fled. Here, 'the quality' were not to be, without further ado, men of ancient title, or else parvenus of wealth who had climbed into favor. Here, men of mind and character were to be 'the quality.' Herein is implicit, of course, democracy of the highest order, but not yet. Herein it was indeed involved that if and when men should arrive at intelligence enough, and were sufficiently under the rule of the grace of God in their hearts, they might then participate in the government of themselves and of their fellows. But until and in order that they might arrive at this degree of grace, it was for those who had the necessary qualifications of intelligence and grace to rule them, in their own interest and for the general good. We glory in manhood suffrage and, more recently, in woman suffrage as well. But it does not appear to be plain to all that we do this as the lesser of two evils. It is the lesser of two evils, because history has taught us that it is perhaps the greatest of all dangers that any one man or any limited class of men should be able to enforce their own claim to be the fittest to rule. It is better to leave that to the grand ordeal of life. Every man and woman must have his chance. We shall see how they come out. But it is naïve to think that democracy has no dangers. The point is that we have found out the dangers of aristocracy, even the aristocracy of the saints. We are now on the good road to find out that democracy also has its dangers. The more absolute it is, the more dangerous. There are no panaceas. It was long ago said that almost any form of government is good enough if it is in the hands of good men, and no form of govern-

ment is good enough in the hands of bad men. Our ancestors had no idea that the vote of a fool is as good as that of a wise man, or the vote of a bad man as weighty as that of a good man. Not they. It was, indeed, perhaps without their knowing it, at the bottom of their own claim to govern, that goodness is open to any man who seeks it, or, as they would have put it, whom God seeks. And when even a working majority of men are good and, in addition, wise, then and not until then will democracy be a measurably safe form of government.

It has often been spoken of as a riddle that Calvinism, whose major tenet was the sovereignty of God and which, in some of its manifestations, rejoiced to heap upon God all the epithets of absolutism which ever occurred to the imagination of man, should nevertheless have been on the whole the driving force of democracy for four hundred years. This is no riddle. The point is that Calvinism almost contemptuously removed all other sovereignties except the sovereignty of God. It put every man under God and under no other. In its earliest form it alleged that God might choose any man. In its more softened forms it believed that any man might choose God. Its fundamental claim was that there is no real power in the world except that of goodness and truth, and that any man may in his measure show forth qualities acceptable to God. The difficulties of the application of this grand truth are, however, almost as formidable as the grand truth itself. Man does not operate on the basis of divine wisdom. The moment men set up to be the only wise and good, they give undeniable evidence that there is a large lack in their truth and goodness. What our fathers really created here was an acknowledged oligarchy, a rule of the few. What they aimed at was an oligarchy of the saints, although of course they would not have used that phrase. But they had that uncanny confidence that the views and purposes of God entirely coincided with their own, which has been the secret of much evil among otherwise good men. Perhaps the best of the Puritans thought of it — or perhaps they did not think of it — as provisional, this oligarchy of the good, until all men, or at least a sufficient number of men, should become good, or as good as circumstances permit. It may,

however, be useful to cite an oft quoted passage from John Cotton, whom one might call the clerical counterpart of Winthrop: "Democracy I do not conceive that God ever ordained as a fit government either for church or commonwealth. As for monarchy and aristocracy, they are both of them clearly proved and directed in Scripture. Yet so as God referreth the whole sovereignty to Himself and setteth up theocracy in both as the best form of government."

Nevertheless, just as we have said in a previous connection, the fact that the fathers did not aim to set up a democracy does not prove that they did not set up a democracy. The world has never been able long to endure the government of saints. The defects of the saints' qualities too soon appear. In aiming to be "too good for human nature's daily food," they create something resembling aversion in the average human mind. The recourse of the world has always been to the reassertion of universal human interests, to the participation of all interests in government and of government in all human interests. The centre of gravity of modern society has passed from the ideals and efforts of those grave men. We run the opposite risk, of a secularism for which the meagreness of their economic status offered little temptation. The moral and spiritual interest which was the preponderant one with them has sunk, not merely below the level at which they held it, but far below the level which will be good for the equilibrium of society. They took, apparently without knowing it, the risk of placing all power in the hands of a small group of those whom they considered the best. We take the risk of putting incalculable power into the hands of vast numbers of men and women of whom we know that they are neither very wise nor very good. When we think clearly about this, we acknowledge that we do so, not because we think this alternative to be absolutely safe, but merely because we think that it is safer than the other. It has been pretty clearly proved that a government in which all the power is in the hands of a class, even if it were the class of the saints, is not good for the world. No really modern mind ever turns back. Yet thus far the history of mankind has been only too often a lamentable oscillation between these two poles,

men enduring the evils of one so long as they could and then throwing themselves with enthusiasm into the evils of the other. It requires only a little thought to see that we are only in the midst, or perhaps near the beginning, of the effort to make democracy safe for the world. And, meantime, no thoughtful man can deny that the elements most necessary to the stability of society are those of a true wisdom, a moral discipline, and a self-sacrificing spirit which the mere democratic impulse does not of itself produce.

But to return to our Puritans, although a democratic nation and, indeed, a growing democracy in the world at large has been the undesigned end of their endeavor, and although it is for this that all the world is just now praising them, even while it is blaming them for almost everything else, yet this was exactly not what the Puritans were trying to do. Their government was a frank rule of the minority, of those who were supposed to be fit. It has, moreover, often occurred that those who esteemed themselves to be the fittest to rule over their fellows have turned out to be conspicuously unfit. Yet it cannot be denied that in the first generation, at least, they were that — the fittest, those Bay Colony Puritans. If there had not been a larger proportion of the learned and devout in the Colony, in those early years, than was ever brought together in any new settlement, so far as we know, in the history of the world, if they had not asserted themselves as effectively as they did, and ruled when necessary with a heavy hand, there is not the least reason to suppose that the history of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and its influence upon this continent and upon humanity would have been essentially different from that of many other frontier settlements which the world has known. There were slave-trading settlements and semi-piratical settlements on our seaboard, gold-digging settlements or those interested in conquest or mere adventure always on our frontier. But you have only to read the inscription on the west gate of Harvard College to realize that you have something different here. That difference did not remain a mere sentiment. It was effective, creative. It was able to control a situation long enough to leave a deposit which has been enduring.

When some of the best of their own sort began to go back to England and multitudes of another sort began to come, they had to hold hard to the ideals which they had set themselves. It was not merely the saints who were cruel. Read the narratives of adventure gathered together in Hakluyt, and realize how cruel were also the mighty sinners before the Lord. It was a cruel age, a long time after the Renaissance. And not merely did our fathers here suffer contradiction from the worst. They had also surprising difficulties presented to them by some of the best among the good. There came among them presently those who not merely did not believe in a Bible commonwealth, but who believed as nearly as possible in no commonwealth at all. There was to be no Bible in the sense in which the Puritans ardently believed it. There was to be rather the free moving of the Spirit of God upon the free spirit of man. There was to be no organized church, only meetings; no hireling ministry, no sacraments, no taxation for religious purposes, no obligation to pay any taxes which a man's own conscience did not approve. These may be viewed as great ideals. The Apocalypse says that in Heaven there will be no temple. Our fathers seem to have felt that they must keep their feet still upon the earth. The episode of Fox's interview with Cromwell may be taken as a parable of the whole situation. Cromwell was far too truly a religious man not to be deeply impressed by the evidence of the spirit of Fox. But Cromwell was too practical a man to think that that would work in the England of the decade in which he had to bear the tumult and contradiction of the world. It is said that he meditated long when the door had closed upon Fox, then he shook his head and took up his burden again.

By inner logic, and in a manner which we cannot think they foresaw, the biblical commonwealth lapsed into an ecclesiastical state. The irony of Puritan ecclesiasticism lay in the fact that it was from Anglican ecclesiasticism, among other things, that they had fled. A quiet-minded settler is quoted as saying, "I did not leave England and the Lord Bishops there in order to be subject to the lords brethren here." In a way, the powers and privileges of the clergy here were their undoing. Circumstances aided them. In the absence of other sources of informa-

tion like the daily press, the swift mail, the telegraph, the radio, the clergy were the purveyors of general information in a measure which is to us almost inconceivable. If the world was to be ruled by the Bible, who could say the last word in controversy except a clergyman? The church was almost the only social centre. There was no theatre, little music except psalms, no lectures save such as the ministers gave, with the possible exception of those which, for a brief season, Anne Hutchinson gave in dissent from the ministers. There were only crude sports, and those frowned upon, while sports were among the liveliest issues in England under Charles. If in the end all this was a great strain upon the spirit of the laity, it presently became a great strain upon the character of the clergy. Harvard College was almost exclusively a clerical institution. There seem to have been few men of real legal education even in the second generation, and medicine, as we understand it, did not exist. Despite Harvard College the general level of intellectual life declined. There were soon few and, presently, no men of more than provincial education. The intensity of the religious mood declined as well. The ministers grew more concerned in proportion as their flocks grew less concerned. The feeling that the favor of God was departing from them led to extravagance and fear. It culminated in superstition like that of the witchcraft craze. The devils who had taken up their abode among them must be driven out. We cannot conceive the witchcraft frenzy moving the men of the first generation as it moved the men of the third. A great change of the religious mood was passing over New England. It must be added that this was only parallel to a change which was making itself felt everywhere else in the Christian world. The seventeenth century in Europe had been the great century for free Christianity, perhaps the greatest since the second. It was the century of Pietism in Germany, of Arminianism in Holland, of Jansenism and Pascal in France, as well as of Puritanism and the Quakers in England and New England. There was but little of that sort of thing in the eighteenth century. Wesleyanism in England, the Great Awakening in America, the Moravian enthusiasm for missions, were not so much a continuance

of the temper of the seventeenth century as rather a reaction from the worldliness into which the church and life of the eighteenth century had fallen. These facts may be read in the fortunes of Jonathan Edwards and his Northampton parish. What England was, one may gather in some measure from the novels of Fielding and Sterne and the Journal of John Wesley. It was not widely different in pre-war and Revolutionary America or in the decades after the Revolution. One has to think of the cool deism of Benjamin Franklin and the fury of Thomas Paine.

Finally, perhaps the most illuminating thing which we could say about the Puritans would be to contrast their notion of liberty with one which widely prevails among us. They sought liberty. So do we. But how did they apprehend the liberty which they sought, and for what end did they seek it? Or did they think it a sufficient end in itself? The great cry of our American people ever since the Revolution has been for liberty. At first it was for political liberty, as witnessed in the War of Independence. Then, it was for commercial liberty, as evidenced by the War of 1812. There was in our Civil War a momentary reaction, to the effect that liberty could not go so far as to cause this to cease to be a nation. The old antagonism between Cavaliers and Roundheads was fought out once more, with the curious interchange of parts that the Cavaliers were for secession and the Roundheads for holding the country together. Yet, incidentally, even that conflict brought the decision that men with black skins were also men and must be free and citizens. In the last two generations we have witnessed a great struggle for industrial liberty, a conflict on behalf of social readjustment. These same decades have witnessed also conflict on behalf of liberty of thought, especially in the area of religious thought. In our time we feel the impact of this movement upon still another fundamental institution of society, namely, the family. The changing status of women, the occasional difficulty of relations between parents and children, are surely only natural phases of the struggle for the right and duty of self-determination on the part of individuals. Marriage is for some not only no longer a sacrament. It is not

even an institution. It is at most a personal relation, terminable at discretion and occasionally even without discretion. Emphasis is put upon the individual in a manner which is in curious contrast with our loud profession of social ideas. The fact is that we have momentarily lost the sense of the inviolable rights of society, without which there can be, in the proper meaning of the term, no individual. It might be added that there can be no proper self-expression if there is no real self to express. Incidentally, it hardly needs saying that this is exactly the state of things in which we should expect alienation from the rigor of the Puritan morale, from the sternness of Puritan political conviction, from the resoluteness of their social discipline. We should anticipate — and discount — denunciation of their theology, misunderstanding of and even contempt for their religion, indiscriminating condemnation of all their ways and works. In this light we need not be too much impressed with what we find. Instead of being ruffled, we might view some of it with a distinct sense of humor. To many persons Puritanism is nothing but a bogey. What passes for opinion upon the subject is mere repetition of prejudice, obloquy the sources of which have not been looked into. It is not wise to spurn the simple and ordinary process of acquiring knowledge, or to esteem a case closed because we have closed our minds against it. We must, however, make clear to ourselves that the Puritan conception of liberty was radically different from that which largely obtains among us.

How are we to account for the fact that that which the Puritan state and church achieved has in some of its fundamental aspects survived for three hundred years? Not merely has it survived. It has expanded beyond any hope which the Puritans can possibly have cherished concerning it. It has expanded almost beyond our own belief, as we think of the smallness of the beginnings and the slowness of the progress for at least half of those three centuries. And, finally, we cannot be sufficiently amazed at the influence which these American, and in part at least Puritan, institutions have had upon the evolution of England itself, on the British empire and commonwealth of nations as it is at this day, and almost, one might say, upon

every nation in the world, including, at this present, China and Turkey. The follies and weaknesses, the superstitions and hypocrisies of men do not usually bear fruit of that sort. Oblivion covers them in much less than three hundred years. Puritan foibles and weaknesses must have been incidental, and on the whole secondary to something else. The greater, therefore, we make their weaknesses, the higher must we rate their strength in order to account for that which they have done. Their sense of duty, their entire fidelity in pursuit of it, must be among the causes of what we see. Sense of duty and entire fidelity in pursuit of it are frequently open to reproach in these days. They seem, however, to have been the qualities which have made nations great and no less are they the qualities which perpetuate their greatness. The Puritans must have had greatness enough to entitle them to a variety of faults. We are hardly entitled to a freedom which we inherit, a comfort which we enjoy, a government upon which we rely, while we understand liberty mainly in the sense of the freedom to say and do anything we please and to scorn our progenitors for not having felt themselves free to do and say anything they pleased. If the most serious gains of civilization were not gained in that way, it is not likely that they will be conserved in that way.

Milton, who was one of the Puritans, wrote an essay, "On Liberty," which is counted one of the greatest treasures of the world, for men who think. Milton wrote also a line, at the end of one of his most touching sonnets, about living "as ever in my great Task-Master's eye." We may not choose to call God our "great Task-Master," but it is to be hoped that that is not because we have no God to whom we pay any particular attention. It is to be hoped that it is not because we have no task, or none to which we hold ourselves, and no idea of the authoritativeness of that task which we recognize as a mastery over ourselves. Life, with all the majesty of the God whom the Puritans loved to think of almost as an oriental monarch, and again with the inexorableness of an infinite taskmaster — life surely sets us a task and holds us up to the reward of having fulfilled it, or else to the penalty of not having fulfilled it. This is as certain as the stars. Milton made much of hell. It is

with him, as in the case of Dante, quite open to question how far, in so transcendent a mind, what we have here is really due to literalism, and how far it was a symbolism without which it is difficult to write poetry and impossible to paint pictures. There are, at all events, passages in which, as in this one, Milton makes real the hell which is real to us so long as we retain the mind which makes us men at all. He lets Satan, surveying Paradise and meditating his revenge upon God through the seduction of mankind, say:

Which way shall I fly
Infinite wrath and infinite despair?
Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell;
And in the lowest deep a lower deep
Still threatening to devour me opens wide,
To which the hell I suffer seems a heaven.

Whatever faults the nobler souls among them manifested were due more nearly, we might say, to the fierce literalism with which they interpreted their symbols, their failure to realize that they were symbols and that we have nothing but symbols with which to speak of God in any case. It was due to the solemn trait which we are trying to describe, to a tremendous, perhaps even terrified and terrifying sense of responsibility which, by and large, was fundamental to everything they did and were. Fear is always cruel. There is biblical warrant for quite another sense of 'the fear of God' from that which they occasionally manifested. They did however live in the great Taskmaster's eye.

They sought liberty. So do we. But the contrast is fundamental. Did they apprehend the liberty for which they made such sacrifice solely as an end in itself? Or did they seek it as a means indispensable to some other end? To put it differently, was it their sole purpose to get free from everybody and everything, or was it, this struggle of theirs, to be free from a State warped through its theory of absolutism, a Church whose authority centred, as they thought, in tradition, from a society which they esteemed corrupt, in order that they might serve God more freely and fully than they had ever been able to do? Liberty was merely a condition precedent for the attain-

ment of ideals for individual souls and for the triumph of the will of God in human society. It was not to be free from religion that they left England. Men free from any serious religion were staying comfortably in England. It was to be free for religion that they left England. It was to be free to religion. It was to be free in religion. It was not to be free from government that they left England. It was to be free for and in and to a government which they hoped to fashion according to the idea they had formed of the will of God. Most certainly they did not realize that this last is an aim which has been frequently sought and never yet attained, and which, until men are better than they are, is unattainable. It is not for that reason unapproachable. Certainly they did not realize that the government which they so eagerly sought to establish would inevitably have certain very bad traits. Certainly they did not realize that all zealotry like their own is certain to have very bad traits. That is a fault which one may lay to the charge of most of the pure idealists of all time. They believed all too easily that a perfect society could be set up upon earth, by the miracle-working power of God, aided a little by the swords and legislation which the Puritans were quite ready to place at His service. That sort of thing, especially in the form of legislation, happens in our own day. Can we wonder that it happened in theirs?

It was, however, for those ideas that they embarked with a hardihood incomparable upon an effort the end of which no one of them would live to see, and the present state of which, if they could see it, would, I fear, give them a heartache. We know that society is very human and will probably long remain so. It is not well, however, that we should realize this so perfectly that we decide to do nothing about it. The remedy is not to have no purposes, nor even to be less diligent in pursuit of them. The remedy is to have more intelligence about human nature, especially about our own. Another recourse is to have patience. The great one is to have unalterable faith and hope and trust, and to keep a kindly mind. Even minor things like a sense of humor help. It is possible that some of the Puritans did not have a great sense of humor.

The price which they paid for their purpose is worthy of more consideration than it has received. Read the inscription on the cenotaph on Cole's Hill at Plymouth. The Puritans practically never mention anything of their physical privations. Naturally so. They had come here freely. They knew what to expect. Those who were too soft could go back. But remember that not a few of those, especially in the Bay Colony, were people of means, some even of fortune, used to a thousand amenities of life. To think that they did not suffer, at all events on seeing what befell their wives and children in such hardship, is absurd. Of their wives it has been said that they had to suffer all that the Pilgrim Fathers suffered and suffered the Pilgrim Fathers besides. As to their children, could they fail to brood over the fact that their children would never have the upbringing which they had had? They bore it all for a purpose. They were silent because it was their purpose and their whole heart was in it. That, in the course of generations, such experience made them hard may be true. It stretched the conscience until this lost all elasticity in the manner described in the phrase, 'the New England conscience.' For the moment, however, we are speaking of the first generation. What did they not suffer, for example, from the relative lack of books! John Harvard, indeed, had in 1638 some three hundred books, which he bequeathed to the college. But John Harvard had something of a fortune. Perhaps we should not read his books, even if they had not been burned, but they fed him. What did they not suffer from the lack of the large society of learned men! To be sure, if there were one hundred and twenty Cambridge men here before 1636, they constituted something of a learned society themselves. But did they never miss the towers of Cambridge or the Backs? Charles River did not then take the place of the Backs, although in this year of grace, the Tercentenary, returning travellers suddenly begin to rejoice that the new Cambridge also has 'backs,' in spite of the fact that they are in front and automobiles remind us of a repose which we lack. Did not the Puritans miss the churches and the cathedrals, the whole glorious heritage of the Middle Age — they to whom religion meant so much? Remember that Eng-

lish Puritans never felt in any great degree the image-smashing fury, the lust of defacing churches which broke out in Holland and Geneva and Scotland, generally with some excuse. Did they not miss the cloisters and the mansions, the castles and the thousands of comfortable homes speaking of generations of the love of home? Did they not miss the carefully kept forests, parks, lawns a hundred years in making, grand trees not even now all sacrificed for newspaper pulp? In a word, did they not miss civilization? What kept them, in face of such impoverishment of all the millennial accumulation of the apparatus of a cultivated life? Nothing but purpose. Nothing hindered them from complaining except that it was their own purpose which brought them here and which kept them here. They valued this so highly that all the deprivations which went with it seemed never worthy to be mentioned. Because they did not mention these, need we think that they did not feel them? We might bare our heads at their silence concerning things undeveloped in their civilization, and then turn with something of their resoluteness to deal with immaturities and evil tendencies vastly more serious in our own.

The fallacy and curse of much of the unending talk concerning liberty which goes on about us is that it is dominated by a negative or centrifugal notion of what liberty is. It is always the cry to get free from somebody or something. Many men and women seem never to have raised the question why it is better to be free. It is assumed out of hand that it is better. But is that a matter of course? The real meaning of liberty, the sovereign justification for it, the sublime necessity of it, lies in the fact that it is impossible to attain the highest good without it. But only the most naïve can maintain the illusion that freedom is all that is necessary. There is no magic in it. If tyranny has been the means of destruction of the best things human, and also, fortunately, of its own self-destruction, unqualified liberty is not far behind in either of these regards. Democracy may be equally destructive of the highest human values, and perhaps even more swiftly destructive of itself. Liberty is the condition of the creation of the characters of men. By the same token, it may be the condition of the destruction

of the characters of men, or of the still more common phenomenon of their failure to have any character to be destroyed. Without liberty, it is certain that mankind will never be in the high sense either wise or good. With liberty, it is by no means certain that they will be either wise or good. This last measure of certainty men have to supply from within themselves. Restraint is of no advantage save as an attempt, along with the sense of liberty, to cultivate a sense as to courses of conduct which the experience of humanity has proved workable and, if possible, to prevent the arrival of complete emancipation before the arrival of a corresponding sense of responsibility. When liberty has been seized upon and abused, the best remedy is probably more liberty. This may be ordinarily trusted to bring people who have no right reason either to reformation or else to book. It is probably the surest, though it may be the slowest, way of finding out who is right. Always it is to be provided that society must not commit suicide, because society owes something to the others, who are, after all, we trust, the vast majority. Some kind of society preserves even the privileges of the revolvers. In fact, it conserves for them the pleasure of having something to revolt against.

In sloppy times of sentiment, one might infer that the main duty of society is to ameliorate the unpleasantnesses of the life of offenders. Such times are however tragically often followed by periods of severity not worthy of civilization. By either of these courses government impairs the respect due to it. Puritan punishments were prevailingly viewed as retribution, legitimate, indeed necessary. Offended majesty required to be appeased. Punishments were everywhere inflicted on that basis in those days. Both the Anselmic theology and the Calvinists set forth those ideas as of the nature even of the divine government. But, as we were saying, except when society loses its temper — and its head — that view has now given place to a better. Yet even this is not the whole case. Governments owe something to the well-intentioned and upright. Our forbears did not think that government existed mainly for the benefit of those who rebelled against it. The practice of law had not developed to such an extent that any considerable

number of lawyers gave themselves to the aim of defeating the aims of justice. Puritans seem to have thought that inasmuch as government existed by the consent and power of the reasonably good, so also it existed for the protection of the measurably good. We cannot seriously doubt that they were right.

The profoundest lesson we can learn from our Puritans in this memorial year is just this. The Puritans saw clearly that liberty bears no relation, or else a false relation, to the highest good, if it means merely the removal of an outward restraint. Unless discipline can be exchanged for self-discipline, unless bondage is superseded by obedience to one's own chosen highest aims, unless compulsion yields place to obligation, the command of a master to the imperative of duty; unless these things are so, liberty inherited is a great danger, liberty wrested by violence from society is a crime, and liberty is itself in the end a curse to the individual and to those about him. Liberty is the essential corollary of duty, and duty of liberty. That sense nobler minds among the Puritans had in high degree. Many among us have it in no degree at all. To it the Puritans owed all that was worthy that they ever achieved. For it, they may be pardoned for much that they did not achieve. To that sense on their part, with all their faults, we owe a large part of that which we inherit. They are worthy of the honor we do them. The highest honor we could do them would be to imitate them in this regard. One would fain believe — or at least hope — that it is mainly from the form, and not from the substance, of the Puritan morale that earnest men among us are alienated. Sometimes solitary leaders, sometimes public uprisings, confirm this belief. Sometimes we suffer disillusionment. One thing is certain, that those who imitate the Puritan method of contending for righteousness — compulsion beforehand, fierce punishments afterward — are not those who contribute most to the love of righteousness, which is, after all, that upon which alone morale securely rests. In a rather famous writing there is mention of a fairly populous community which could have been saved for the sake of — we should probably say by the influence of — ten good men, if so many could have been found in it. They were not found. This is

perhaps not a fortunate illustration, because not all, even of the descendants of the Puritans, are as familiar as were the Puritans with the literature from which it is drawn. But it does emphasize the duty of brave and farseeing men, the responsibility of a minority, until it can — and if it can — win over the majority. Moral movements usually begin in that way. If, as we sometimes think, we have in rather distressing measure run through the moral capital with which those stern men, with their compeers in other colonies, three hundred years ago endowed the New World venture, it behooves us to inquire how, in other forms indeed but in the same eternal substance, we are to make good the loss of morale. Our ventures are vaster and more complex, by far, than any they ever dreamed. Upon moral forces more than upon all else depend the fates of nations and the destiny of mankind. The Puritans knew that.

PROFESSOR DEWEY DISCUSSES RELIGION

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THE publication of Professor Dewey's Gifford Lectures, under the title "The Quest for Certainty,"¹ affords a new opportunity for a study of the main emphases in the work of our leading American philosopher, and also for the clarification of the relations of his thought to the fundamental postulates of religion. A large part of the book is given over to an analysis of the conditions under which knowledge is attained. This paper will attempt a statement and criticism of the more important parts of the argument.

Professor Dewey affirms at the outset that men have always wanted security and have tried to gain it by effecting changes in the world about them. Sometimes, he says, they attempted to propitiate environing powers. When that failed, they tried to change the world by first modifying the self and its attitudes. At other times they invented arts and through them directed natural processes toward humanly desirable ends. This meant transforming the world through overt, experimental, in its way scientific action. But from the time of the Greek philosophers on, men began to think of action as inferior to so-called 'pure thought.' The world of practice was considered uncertain, and overt action was supposed to involve risks from which thought was free. Only the strictly intellectual path was regarded as leading to certainty. The Greeks glorified the changeless and bequeathed to later philosophy the view that the task of knowledge was that of uncovering the antecedently real instead of grappling intelligently with practical problems as they might arise. Knowledge was also set up as a sort of measure of reality, and the real was supposed to be limited to that which existed antecedent to man's knowing and was revealed in it. Also, forms of experience other than those involved in knowing the antecedently real were discounted. Out of it all came the 'spec-

¹ Milton Balch and Company, New York, 1929.

tator' theory of knowledge by which the knower was put entirely outside the thing known and made unable to influence it. So the difficulties which have arisen from the separation made between theory and practice, between knowledge and action, come ultimately, Dewey says, from the eagerness to reach that which is secure. For security was defined by philosophers in terms of certainty of knowledge, and knowledge was measured by its conformity to that which was unchangeable.

Trouble has been made also for man's thought about values. On the supposition that knowledge is the only reputable form of experience and that values as properties of antecedent being are objects of knowledge, it was natural that the limitation of the real world, on the basis of the Newtonian physics, to particles of matter in motion should have seemed to mean the passing of the realm of value. But values do not set a problem for the intellect. They do not exist as something to be discovered by the knowing process. They exist as experienced, and the only problem they raise is that of so controlling experience that they may be made to happen more continuously. Knowing, itself a mode of experiencing, should be used to facilitate the control of objects for purposes which are not cognitive at all. Ideals, meanings, and values should be wrested from experience and regulated in the interests of society. Knowing is not a form of aesthetic enjoyment of properties of nature, regarded as a work of divine art, but is rather a means of secular control. We must reduce our experienced objects to neutral relations, and so regulate them, forming our ideas of objects in terms of their interactions with each other instead of in terms of the qualities they present, and recognizing that knowing is itself interaction, the way in which other interactions are subjected to control.

The new physics confirms the view that interactions or relations form the subject matter of knowledge, also the pragmatic theory that knowledge is directed toward the consequences of experimental operations. We are taught now that length as a conception is but the operations which determine it. The concept, says Bridgman, is synonymous with the set of operations. Eddington interprets Einstein to mean that each physical

quantity should be defined as the result of certain operations of measurement and calculation. C. S. Peirce anticipated this, says Dewey, in his view that the meaning of the idea of an object consists of the consequences which occur when the object is acted on in a particular way. The new science confirms the instrumentalist view of conceptions and solves the old sensationalist-a priorist controversy. Sensory qualities are cognized not in isolation, nor yet because connections are brought to them in some non-experimental way, but simply as the consequences of intentionally performed operations. The relations are brought to them through the operations by which they are defined, these operations being themselves matters of experience. Sense-qualities as presented are challenges, problem-setters; only as consequences of operations are they known. Objects are at first fragmentary and perplexing. When the nature of the problem is located, the way is clear to an operation by which the doubt can be resolved. Science has always been the furthering of operations which disclose relationships. Length is the relations of an object placed end on end a certain number of times. Space, time, and motion are relations rather than properties of an antecedent being. Newton's supposed property of hardness has been reduced to mass, and mass has been seen to vary with velocity. Now Einstein has made mass, time, and motion into elements which appear in mathematical equations and are translated into formulas with respect to each other. We deal in philosophy with events, and knowledge is concerned with discovering correlations among these events in the interest of controlling them. Validity depends not on the preëxistent but on the consequent. Colors are conceived in terms of numbers, and these conceptions are valid in the degree in which through them future events become predictable. The statement, 'red is so many vibrations,' means, 'this is the effective way to think about red.'

Conceptions are thus definitions of consequences of operations. Their validity depends on their ability to relate events and is tested by results. Symbols, which may be words, acts, or gestures, enable us to anticipate results and so to control them. Ideas are active and anticipatory, not finalities but hypotheses.

Knowledge is itself a kind of action giving meaning to nature, thinking is directed activity, intelligence means purposeful operations. The object lies in the future as the result of reflective operations which dispose that which already existed. Science shows us that there is no real warfare between sensible and rational factors. They supplement each other in the task of rearranging the originally experienced material for the construction of a new object whose properties can be known. It is the rearrangement which gives previously irrelevant objects the status of objects-of-knowledge. Science has always accepted the consequences of its experiments as constituting the known object instead of trying to identify it with a prior existent. Scientific knowledge has come through an overt experimental act by which organization is effected, and verification has meant the transition from a problematic situation to one that is resolved.

The pragmatic view that the knower is not a passive spectator is confirmed by Heisenberg's principle. Heisenberg showed that if we metrically fix velocity, there is a range of indeterminateness in the assignment of position, and vice versa. Either velocity or position can be fixed, but not both together. This, Professor Dewey says, is because both belong to our intellectual apparatus for dealing with antecedent existence. Newton assumed that positions and velocities were *there* in nature, independent of our knowing. Complete knowledge would then, as Laplace claimed, mean complete ability to predict. But now we see that the rôle of the observer must be taken into account. Even in such a comparatively simple matter as visual experience, light can be observed only in drops and pellets, so that what is known or seen is a product of the object and the observing process itself.

Thinking, then, is deferred action, response to the doubtful as such. Knowledge means a question answered, a difficulty disposed of. In so far as any experience points to nothing beyond and stimulates no search for further experience, it is aesthetic. Sometimes, says Dewey, the completeness of the object enjoyed gives the experience a quality so intense that it is religious. Then peace and harmony suffuse the entire universe as

gathered up into a situation having one particular focus. There is freedom, but we must think of it not as freedom of the will but as resident in the use which knowledge makes of preference. We are free to the degree that we know what we are about. There is also purpose in the universe, since we find it in man and man is a part of nature.

A value is whatever is taken to have rightful authority in the direction of conduct. No extra-experiential principle need be invoked to give status to values. But the fact that they arise out of experience does not mean that values are merely objects of desire. Values are only those enjoyments which are consequences of interaction. Without reflective thought there are only problematic goods. The enjoyed is not the same thing as the enjoyable, the satisfying as the satisfactory. To say that something is enjoyed is merely to make a statement about a fact already in existence, while to say that it is enjoyable or satisfactory involves an estimate, a judgment, and gives a direction to conduct. It is foolish to try to 'justify' values. Their existence cannot be doubted. What is needed is direction, experiment, reflective activity, that their existence may be made more secure. Judgments concerning values, like knowledge itself, must be based not on prior considerations but on consequences. This will mean increased dependence on science for data as to value-judgments. It will also mean the elimination of subjectivism in the sense that the emphasis will be placed on changes to be made in the outside world rather than in the inner self. The day will come when men will be ashamed of their loyalty to abstract principles and proud only of their devotion to concrete facts. A moral law, like a law of physics, will be recognized, not as something to swear by, but as a formula showing the way to respond in the presence of specified conditions.

So Dewey would lead us to a new Copernican revolution. Kant pointed out the dependence of all knowing on the knower, and showed that the rationality of the universe is a copy of that found in the human intellect. But this revolution would mean freedom from dependence on knowledge as a relation to prior existence. The world as we experience it should be taken as

real even when not known or understood. To deny the coextensiveness of knowledge and existence is not, Dewey thinks, to disparage knowledge, but merely to show that knowledge's exclusive business is that of transforming situations that are disturbed into those that are controlled. Not all existence asks to be known, and that which does should be known in an experimental manner.

Finally, the religious attitude is the sense of the possibilities of existence and a devotion to them as distinct from an acceptance of what is given. Religion should not commit itself to opinions about matters of past fact but should cultivate devotion to the values of the future. It should concern itself with the rightful demand of righteousness for reverence, independent of its ability to prove the existence of an antecedently righteous Being. Schleiermacher's view of religion as a sense of dependence comes near the heart of the matter if we realize that dependence is a form of devotion to the cultivation of a sense of ideal possibilities. With such a religion science could have no possible conflict.

Dewey is himself so great a force in the thinking of our time that he is almost as much an institution as he is an individual. His work has served as a rallying point for the various modern currents of discontent with traditional ways of meeting philosophical issues. That it has met the needs of our age is shown by the way in which it has encouraged and stimulated the progress of numerous reform movements and the thinking and practice of uncounted individuals. Part of the power which this philosophy shows comes from the fact that its author, in true empirical fashion, has not theorized about knowledge as it should be, but has gone directly to knowing as an experience and asked in what it consists. The most effective kind of knowing procedure which has yet been discovered is obviously the scientific. What, then, is the scientific process? This is Dewey's fundamental question. If we can discover what the object of knowledge is for science, we can see what it is in any experience out of which knowledge comes. Similarly, if we can trace the steps by which scientific truth is established, we shall learn how truth in general may be known.

Yet it seems to be true that Dewey, in taking science as the type of true knowing and in suggesting that epistemological questions pale into insignificance beside science's extraordinary practical achievements, has neglected certain issues with which traditional philosophy has always been concerned, and to which, if it is to be critical of all knowing procedures, including the scientific, it must always give its attention. Is not even the distinction which Dewey believes to have been so vicious, that between theory and practice, a natural one, and one which philosophy as analysis can hardly afford to ignore? In his eagerness to have philosophy take an active part in the attempt to make this a better world, has not Dewey been unduly impatient with its interest in the problem of knowledge, where knowledge is other than scientific? And does his dissatisfaction with the urge toward an absolute take into account the pragmatic functioning of absolutistic conceptions in history? The desire to be absolutely certain in one's knowledge or to recognize that which has an absolute claim on one's conduct is not in itself an unworthy desire. The fear of being disloyal to the facts or oblivious to obligations is not something to be discouraged, nor is the desire for the security which comes from a clear understanding of what is real and compelling an ignoble one. Of course Dewey believes that we must be freed from the view that the processes of nature as so far revealed are inevitable, and also from the prejudice that moral principles in their abstractness are sure guides to conduct, if we are to progress toward greater clarity and honesty. But the question is whether the attempt to know abstract principles and present or past facts, as philosophy has traditionally tried to know them, is not compatible with an open-minded and experimental attitude toward future events. The desire for knowledge about what has been true need not crowd out a willingness to be open-minded toward what the future may bring. And often it has been just the vision of that which as a general principle of conduct is authoritative for man which has stimulated the highest effort to make that which now exists conform to that which should exist. Dewey's attitude toward the absolute of metaphysical idealism is here less truly empirical than that of James. James went to extremes

of relativism, it is true. He claimed that the belief in the absolute is good, and even valid, for one person when not for another, and for a person at certain periods in his life though not at other periods. And this admission of the value of the absolute was accompanied by an insistence on the reality of the demands of the free, active, creative life. But this very relativism and seeming lack of consistency is perhaps more faithful to Dewey's own view of the world than is the theory which rules out from the start any positive value for absolutistic conceptions. James's view is the one which really fits the notion of a changing world. And his recognition of possible values attendant on belief in the absolute is the less dogmatic, the less chained to inevitability, the less prescriptive in its declarations as to what must be so. Dewey is more rigorous here than James, and more unflinching in his determination not to allow the evils of the present to receive any undeserved mitigation by such a simple process as neglecting them and turning toward a distant ideal. Yet one way to bridge the yawning chasm between present ill and distant ideal is to admit that the ideal may itself be a possibility.

Dewey finds that philosophy in concerning itself with antecedent reality has exalted knowledge at the expense of other types of experience and so has made knowledge the measure of reality itself. The question may be raised here whether philosophy has not made knowledge the measure of reality only in so far as reality can be known, and also whether it was not legitimate for philosophy to do this in so far as it was concerned with the question of what can be known. If philosophy is to ask merely, What can be done? it may as well consider itself a minor and somewhat ineffectual branch of sociology. But is not the question as to what can be known itself a rightful one to ask? And if we ask this question, have we fully answered it when we say that the object of knowledge is the result of experimental, directed action? If Dewey means by this that the object of knowledge can never be known as it is, but merely as it appears in the knowing process, and that it must appear in the knowing process to be different from what it really is, since the process itself effects changes in the object, then he is indeed

giving us a definition which is based on a recognition of the traditional problems that have arisen in the course of epistemological inquiry. But I cannot believe, first, that he intends to leave us with such a skeptical conclusion, one which among other things would make the future application of all supposed present knowledge extremely dubious, especially as he has himself pointed to the practical results of knowledge as furnishing a way out of skepticism, and has shown that we have a right to define as knowledge that which solves our problem; or, secondly, that he means to disregard the possibility of inference. But if we can infer from the present knowing process what the object is like apart from the process, then the *only* object of knowledge is not the one which is the outcome of experimental action. My feeling is that Dewey actually wishes to inject a little healthy skepticism into the philosophical arena, to save us from any dogmatic denial of the modifiability, through creative intelligence, of the course of nature itself. Yet, as has so often been shown, an undue amount of skepticism will defeat its own purposes, including those which are pragmatic.

The definition which Dewey gives seems to make knowing the same thing as thinking. The process which he describes as the knowing process is essentially the process of thinking oneself out of a difficult situation or toward a desirable conclusion. This means that certain neglected aspects of the knowing process are brought out, but it also means that violence is done to the ordinary sense in which the term is used. Is the real knowable? This is the way the question has traditionally been put. Dewey says that this putting of the question has led to speculative difficulties and practical omissions. But this does not in itself show that the question was not the right one to ask. And why does this way of putting the question make the knower a passive spectator? Even for traditional philosophy the knower may know his object as it is in order to change it into what it should be.

I suspect that what Dewey really wishes to give us here is a new metaphysics, and that his theory of knowledge is framed chiefly with the idea of meeting the demands of this metaphysics. Objects of knowledge are eventual because existences are

constantly changing, and the thing known is the result of operations directed toward it and only that, simply because the thing is itself a changing thing, and is itself what it is known as only at the moment when it is known. But the question comes up again as to the degree of the precariousness by which we are faced. How much of the old inevitability has gone? Is there no such thing as scientific information, meaning by that a stable body of data for future experiments? How predictable is the future, and to what extent can we use what we had supposed were known facts for human and social ends? Dewey would have us remain adjustable, I take it, and not have us expect existences to conform rigidly to the canons we set up. Yet I think there is need for a clearer definition as to the degree of contingency that may be expected, and the points at which our flexibility will be called on. And is the object of knowledge truly an object of knowledge in any stable sense, or is it merely an object of experience valid for the moment of experience alone?

Dewey objects to the fact that philosophy has restricted its subject matter to that which can take on the form of cognitive certainty. But in the first place, it has done this only as epistemology, not as ethics and aesthetics, and in the second place, it may be asked whether it has done it in an illegitimate way. In "Experience and Nature" Dewey pointed out the difference between being or having on the one hand, and knowing on the other. Many experiences come which are not knowing experiences. But is not the traditional philosophical assertion the assertion that what is real must be knowable rather than the assertion that everything that goes on is a knowing process? To have the measles is not the same thing as to know what the measles is. And it should be possible to know what the measles is and what having the measles is without asserting that having and knowing are the same thing. In concerning itself with knowledge philosophy has simply set up knowledge as more desirable than mystery, and has not committed itself to any exclusive interpretation of the nature of experience. And how can Dewey himself make assertions about existences and their changing character unless these things are themselves known?

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Further, is not his assertion that philosophy must respect the canons of external evidence, along with fairness and consistency, simply a statement of the usual philosophical procedure?

Again, even if according to a specialized and technical definition of a scientific process such a conception as length is defined for the scientific observer as the result of certain operations of measurement, can we say that in all cases our knowledge is of the result of operations rather than, as in ordinary usage, of that which the result of the operations has made clear? And when Dewey observes that to say, "*Red is so many changes*," is the effective way to think it, is he making effectiveness the same thing as accuracy? Also, if traditionally there has been a question as to who shall determine accuracy, there is in his philosophy just as much the question as to who determines final effectiveness. Again, one can imagine situations where 'effectiveness' is not the crucial question. One test of validity surely is usefulness. But, as Dewey has himself said, another is internal consistency and conformity to external evidence. Furthermore, Einstein's reaction to the Michelson-Morley experiment is cited as a case of the working of the experimental theory of knowledge. Instead of maintaining the old view in the face of the new results Einstein asked what changes in conceptions the result demanded. The conceptions thus meant, says Dewey, the consequences of experimental action instead of references to prior reality. But why were the conceptions themselves not based on the prior reality which the experimental activity revealed? Perhaps Dewey means here that the present reality is all that is known, and the prior reality not known at all. But if so, I believe that the question of skepticism, raised above, recurs. It is natural to think that the fact about the velocity of light was a fact, existent in the universe, before the experiment which discovered it took place. And what is to be said of the seeming effectiveness of the conceptions of the velocity of light held before the experiment? They were effective and useful. But would they not have been more so if more nearly faithful to the prior reality now revealed? Effectiveness itself seems to be difficult to measure, that is, to know or recognize. Dewey says that most philosophies, in order to avoid an infinite regress,

have stopped short with some object or truth as directly known. Yet this, he says, is arbitrary dogmatism. Who guards the guardians? But our question would be, Who judges the final effectiveness? He remarks (p. 185) that "the experimental discovery that the velocity of light remains the same when measured either with or against the direction of the earth's movement was totally unaccountable on the basis of previous knowing. But scientific men accepted the *consequences* of their experimental operations as constituting the known object, rather than feeling under obligation to 'prove' them by identification with what was said to be antecedently known." But is the important thing that the discovery was a *consequence* or that it was the discovery of a verifiable fact? And does not verifiability suggest something other than effectiveness as a criterion? That science through its use of experimental activities has added vastly to the richness of life is obvious. Has it not added also to what in the ordinary sense of the word we can only call man's knowledge of nature, knowledge of that with which as an existent reality man must deal in order to make his life effective?

And is not pragmatism, or the theory of experimental knowledge, somewhat hampered by its exclusive dependence on science for its illustrations and for the application of its views? What shall we say of historical knowledge? Does Dewey's view that the knower makes a difference in the known apply here? To this there are at least three different types of answer offered on behalf of pragmatism by three different philosophers. James put the question in the following form ("Meaning of Truth," p. 224). How can the truth about Caesar's existence, a truth about something already 2000 years old, depend on anything that happens now? How can my acknowledgment of it be made true by the acknowledgment's own effects? To answer this James claimed that the givenness of Caesar's existence contains in itself neither truth, falsity, nor irrelevance. These depended, he said, on something coming from the statement about Caesar. And this something can only be defined with reference to the statement's functional workings. James also says that the criticism that a belief may be true on pragmatic principles even though its object does not exist, is absurd.

Of course the object of a pragmatically true belief must exist, but on a pragmatic basis. It must exist in terms of the consequences of the concept which points to it. A belief, to be true on pragmatic grounds, must first of all not be contradicted by anything else known to the holder of the belief, and second must lead to evidences, direct sense presentations, which point to the existence of the object (*ibid.* p. 275). Again he remarks (p. 282) that we must not carry the word 'truth' indiscriminately from the subjective into the objective realm, applying it sometimes to a property of opinions and at other times to the facts which the opinions assert. When by the use of the word 'that' we create a proposition, such as 'that Caesar is dead,' we create an ambiguity. For 'that Caesar is dead' may refer either to the fact or the belief. James feels that the pragmatic usage has at least the virtue of keeping terms clear. The only intelligible and practical meaning which can be assigned to the difference in our beliefs which is referred to by the words 'true' or 'false' is given to them by their consequences (p. 273).

Schiller (in a letter to the present writer) adds a word of explanation by admitting that at first it sounds paradoxical to say that the truth about the past depends on future consequences, but going on to claim that the difficulty disappears if one takes into account (1) that the past and its immutability is itself a pragmatic construction for the purpose of arranging our (present) experiences; and (2) that whenever any question about the past arises fresh inquiry has to be made, and the truth about it then does depend on the (future) consequences of the inquiry. Thus, he says, historical truth is no exception to the rule that all truth must be verified and that no verification is ever so absolute as to preclude further verification should the need for it arise.

In "A Short Catechism concerning Truth" Dewey explains further his position concerning truth about past facts. Like James he advances the pragmatic criterion as a means for overcoming difficulties in the older view. Like him he asks how an idea or a belief can on the ordinary intellectualistic basis be sure of hitting its own object and no other. If the object be an historical fact, the difficulty is as evident as in James's illustra-

tion of an idea about the moon, meaning one special moon and no other. The pragmatic solution is that the results of the belief must interlock harmoniously with the consequences of the past event. And Dewey further claims a difference between the content of a judgment and the reference of that content. If I form a judgment about yesterday's rain, the content involves past time but the reference and function of the judgment point to the future. In articles in the *Journal of Philosophy* (vol. XIX) he also points out that for a pragmatist nothing deserves the name knowledge which does not admit of verification. Judgments about the past then are hypothetical until verified, and verification can occur only in some object of present or future experience. Historians may seek, he says in a revealing phrase, for "new, as yet hidden facts." The question whether or not I wrote a letter yesterday does not raise the issue of truth or knowledge until I form a hypothesis and test it out by finding the letter or getting on its trail. The question what Brutus wore the day he murdered Caesar is one to which such terms as 'judgment' and 'knowledge' are irrelevant, since continuity has been interrupted and no observable consequences are in existence. If the meaning is wholly in and of the past, it cannot be recovered for knowledge. The true object of a judgment about the past is a past event having a connection continuing into the present and future, the event and its consequences forming together the object of the judgment. The subject matter of the judgment may be in the past; the object cannot be. The subject matter must be progressively tested and sifted till it coheres in an object when judgment terminates. The subject matter may have existed at any time. It is the later consequences which make it into an object of knowledge.

The plausibility of the pragmatic argument in each of these cases arises from the fact that an arbitrary definition is at the start made of judgment, knowledge, truth, or experience, and the description of the situation is then argued as acceptable because it conforms to the definition. If meaning signifies only practical working differences, if the only important aspect of the judging process is its reference to future events, if truth is what happens to an idea, if the distinction between physical and

psychical is pointless, if the only kind of knowledge to be taken into account is that which has to do with thinking one's way out of difficulties, if the past is but a pragmatic construction for the purpose of arranging our present experiences, then of course truth or knowledge or judgments about past events have no import until their pointing or reference to the future in some way works itself out in practice. The whole matter than boils itself down to the question whether the pragmatist has the right to define things as he does. His definition seems to do violence to the ordinary facts of experience. It does avoid certain traditional ambiguities, such as the question how the knower, as one order of being, can know the known, as another order. But it does so in Dewey's hands only by restricting arbitrarily the meaning of the term knowledge, ruling out all perceptual knowledge for example, as well as present knowledge of past events, and limiting knowing to the results of experimental controlled action.

Truth and verification are for the pragmatist much the same thing. But should they be? Is it not more natural and more accurate, that is to say more faithful to the total situation with which we are presented, to think of verification as a testing, by consequences if the pragmatist will have it so, of a relationship which is or is not there the moment the judgment is formed? Dewey in the "Shorter Catechism" claims that it is not. If, he says, an idea about a past event is already true because of some mysterious static correspondence between it and the past event, how can its truth be *proved* by the future consequences of the idea? Is not the answer that verification, or proof, means not the creation of new relations but making clear, disclosing, revealing the fact that such relations had all along existed? An idea may be true now even though the fact that it is true is not known surely until further tests have been made. And an idea may function as true for a long time even though it is all the while false. I had for five years the idea that honesty only was to be found among the employees of a Northampton bank. The consequences of action on that idea seemed to be good. But one day the fact was revealed that the idea had all along been false. It was not made false by the revelation of a defalcation, it was

false from the start. It was false, and would have continued to be so even if the fact had not been revealed during the lifetime of anyone connected with the institution. Its truth or falsity did not depend on its consequences — in fact, consequences should not have been necessary even for the disclosure of its falsity. If the bank examiners had been thorough in their analysis, the falsity which was from the beginning a part of the total situation in which the judgment found itself would have been laid bare.

Dewey gives us another illustration. A physician, he says (p. 207), in diagnosing a case deals with an individual. He draws on a store of general principles of knowledge, but does not attempt to do away with the individuality of the specific case. Instead, he uses general statements to discover what this particular case is *like*. But, we may ask, in trying to find out what it is like, to use Dewey's own words, is the physician not measuring it by antecedent reality? And is it true that he is not trying to reduce it to an exact specimen of laws of physiology and pathology, or to do away with its uniqueness? Why is not this just what he is trying to do? Is not it only in terms of that which is antecedently known that the physician wishes to deal with the case at all? It is the classification of the case, its fitness to be included under one or more general conceptions, and not its individuality, that is both pertinent and important. We can agree when Dewey says (p. 179) that the original perception of the patient by the physician furnishes the problem for knowing, and that the patient is something to be known. But does this lead to the further statement that the object of knowledge — and consistently with the theory it must be the only object of knowledge — is prospective and eventual? The patient presents the problem. The physician does not know the solution, it is true, until after his examination, or, if you will, after his experimental and controlled action. But, strictly speaking, is the solution the *object* of knowledge? Everyone wants to have the solution known, true enough, but knowledge of the solution depends on knowledge of the patient's trouble. The trouble certainly exists before the physician knows what it is. Just as surely, the physician must know what it is before he can pre-

scribe for it. To call the object of knowledge only the result of the physician's experimental action is to direct attention, it is true, to the practical job of curing the patient, it is also in a way to substitute encouragement for fear, as the pragmatist wishes to have done, but it is not to describe the entire situation as it exists for physician and patient, and that in a philosophical inquiry we are bound to do. In another place (p. 207) Dewey says: "Any instrument which is to operate effectively in existence must take account of what exists, from a fountain pen to a self-binding reaper, a locomotive, or an airplane. But 'taking account of,' 'paying heed to,' is something quite different from literal conformity to what is already in being. It is an adaptation of what previously existed to accomplishment of a purpose." But, we may ask, why is the 'taking account of' always used for the specific purposes Dewey has in mind? Does the scientist 'take account of' what he finds under the microscope only in order that it may be utilized in the interests of fountain pens or airplanes? It may be so utilized, it is well so to utilize it, unless the fountain pen be a poison-pen or the airplane be used for dropping bombs, but the mere purpose of adding to the world's knowledge is a purpose which most scientists themselves would recognize as legitimate. 'Taking account of' may lead to consequences which are important and useful. It may also be simply a recognition of that which is.

The questions arising out of the pragmatic philosophy and its treatment of the problem of knowledge have in years past been discussed in so much detail that there might seem to be no point in taking them up again. They arise with new insistence, however, in this latest book of Dewey and demand more analysis. It seems more clear than ever that a major part of the appeal of the pragmatic philosophy comes from the arbitrariness of its definitions. This is an especially serious matter because of the unclearness in the philosophical word today and the need, more acute than ever, for preciseness of statement. Dewey's disciples have said that old concepts, symbols, words, must be given new meaning if intellectual growth is to occur. But in the long run conceptions grow more naturally and healthily with the expanding of intellectual horizons and the un-

folding of new richness of content than by a process which focusses itself on one element in them and disregards the others.

Aside from its references to the problem of knowledge the book raises several questions. The desire for certainty is made the root of all evil. But is this desire in itself unworthy, and must it lead, as he says, to a depreciation of action? And why the distinction between thought as timid in its demand for security and action as courageous in its willingness to take risks? Is there no risk for thought? Is the attempt to think one's way through to what is final never dangerous? And is the security of intellectual honesty an unworthy security, or the search for final and authoritative goodness, beauty, and truth nothing but a weak wish for protection? Again, Dewey laments (p. 32) that the meaning of 'practical' is limited to considerations of ease, comfort, riches, bodily security, and police order, and is not extended to all forms of action by means of which all the values of life are rendered more secure, including the diffusion of the fine arts and the cultivation of taste, the processes of education and the activities which render human life more significant and worthy. Yet is not the distinction between practical and cultural one which must be made whatever terms be used?

Again, Dewey observes (p. 35) that the thought that values which are unstable in this world are eternally secure in a higher realm may give consolation to the depressed, but does not change the existential situation. But has it not often changed the existential situation? When the poet sings, "It fortifies my soul to know that though I perish truth is so," he means that it fortifies him not only to endure passively where that may be necessary, but also actively to combat evils as they appear. The vision of the ideal has lured men to the attempt to make it effective in this life.

All who are interested in the attempt to give values a logical as contrasted with a merely psychological status will welcome the plea made toward the end of the book for discrimination between that which satisfies and that which is and should be truly satisfactory. Without the interventions of thought, we read (p. 259), enjoyments are not values but problematic goods,

becoming values only when they reissue in a changed form from intelligent behavior. To declare something 'satisfactory' is to assert that it meets specifiable conditions; it is making a judgment that the thing 'will do.' That it is satisfying is the content of a proposition of fact; that it is satisfactory is a judgment, an estimate, an appraisal. But does not the judgment relate to that which *is*, if we are to have any basis for predicting what the consequences themselves 'will be'? We may have to wait for the consequences to happen, but we know now what they will be when they do occur, and we know because we know what is and what has been. Is not Dewey himself saying something like this when he observes (p. 268) that the notion is prevalent that values are already well known, so that all that is lacking is the will to cultivate them in the order of their worth, while actually, from his own point of view, what is lacking is not the will to act upon goods known already but the will to know what they are? Does he mean, 'to know what they will be'? And when (p. 278) he says that in the utopian world to which he looks forward men will be ashamed of accepting beliefs and 'principles' on the ground of loyalty, does he mean that they will be ashamed of loyalty to the principles of honesty and charity as such? Is not Dewey himself perfectly convinced as to his own criteria? Is he truly experimental and open-minded on the issue that knowledge must be devoted to a practical and social end? And has he ever shown why social ends are desirable?

Is the quest for certainty unworthy? This is the fundamental question raised by the book. The answer seems to be: It is when it has diverted attention from practical things to be done; it is not in so far as it has been the attempt to grasp that which is sure for knowledge and normative for conduct. Huxley has beautifully expressed it on the intellectual side in saying that one must sit down before fact as a little child. Plotinus was more inclusive when he suggested that the unified real is presupposed intellectually, judged morally, and revealed aesthetically as love discovers. Man's search for an absolute is for that which has a claim upon him, be it the good, the beautiful, or the true. To this he gives himself in devotion, letting the consequences

be what they may. Is this, as the jargon of our day would have it, an escape from reality? It seems rather to have been a refusal to allow the injustice and brutality of present conditions to have the last word in determining what is real. Devotion to the absolute whose claims have been disregarded has been a way of asserting that the futility and aimlessness of the present are not final. It has meant a revolt against the tragic present in the attempt to eliminate tragedy from the future.

The setting up of an ideal of intellectual and moral certainty may have led at times to misunderstandings and misinterpretations, but so, one must add, has pragmatism itself. Why are we so prone to ask today whether an individual is 'adjusted' to his environment and whether his beliefs are instruments toward such adjustment? In abnormal cases this may be necessary, but normally the tests we should apply to ideas and beliefs are not tests of practical adjustment, but those of inner consistency and external conformity to fact. If they are met, we can afford to let the consequences take care of themselves. And if in the interests of the moral claim the strictly intellectualistic ideal be qualified sufficiently to take account of the practical need for right thinking, it is difficult to see how even this step can be taken without referring to some norm that is objective in a sense which the pragmatist is unwilling to allow. We may say, for instance, that a person has a moral right to form a judgment which is believed to be satisfactory in view of all the purposes which ought to be considered. This is to make intellectual judgments subject to moral or practical demands, and so to meet the pragmatist's objection of emptiness and formalism. But even this statement of the case has a necessary reference to norms which must in some sense be prior to the knowing process itself.

The one place, aside from the case of the patient who needs to be helped back to a normal condition, where we have the right to allow an interest in consequences to have a part in the formation of our beliefs seems to be the case which James emphasizes and Dewey neglects. When the religious issue is presented, where final evidence is lacking but a decision is required, James seems to be correct in making the claim that the consequences of belief not only may but should influence the decision. It is

most clear in the issue of optimism against pessimism. Is life worth while? No, not for us if we believe it is not. Yes, if we believe it is and our belief stimulates us to make it so. Here the psychological influence of the idea held steadily before the mind does help to create its own verification. Here pragmatism seems to find more suitable illustrations than in the field of science. The scientist's job is that of copying reality as accurately as possible. For the scientist the consequences of experiment may on the pragmatic basis be the object of knowledge, but on the same basis they also furnish new data for new experiments. Where does the series end? If knowledge is possible only when all the results of all the experiments are in, then knowledge is impossible.

Pragmatism is helping to humanize both philosophy and religion. It has greatly widened and enlivened the whole intellectual field. It has interpreted science to itself and shown how scientific method may apply to a part of philosophical procedure. It is, in other words, functioning well in the intellectual life of our time. But in abjuring the final it has denied itself finality; in discrediting certainty it has made its own future uncertain.

THE AUTHORESS OF REVELATION — A CONJECTURE

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Of what value is a pure conjecture, unverified, perhaps unverifiable? In the face of possible disparagement we answer, Much every way. A conjecture is the most concrete and tangible form of the working hypothesis. When directed at some important yet knotty point of criticism it coördinates and articulates the data, narrowing the question down to sharply definable points. It is the oxyacetylene blowpipe of historical inquiry. It may be misdirected, but if so is promptly quenched. If rightly applied it goes to the heart of the matter. Criticism in this form laughs at the epithet 'destructive.' Discarding the defensive armor of negative propositions it comes boldly forth into the open, flinging down its challenge of pointed affirmation and defying disproof. As long as its challenge remains unanswered it serves to rouse debate from the lethargy of stagnation. Accepted or rejected, it stimulates to new energy the forces of liberalism and conservatism alike. In the end it works inevitably for the truth. Against the truth it can do nothing.

This, and not any desire to compensate a feministic age for rejection of Harnack's gallant ascription to Priscilla of the authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is the motive to which we respond in ascribing the composition of the so-called Revelation of John to one of the four prophesying daughters of Philip the evangelist, that one, namely, who according to Polycrates of Ephesus (195 A.D.) married "in the Lord" (that is, became the wife of a Christian), and settled in Ephesus, her father and at least two of her sisters making their home at the not-distant Hierapolis until their death.

Before submitting to one more reinspection the much-debated literary product known as the Revelation of John we should first scrutinize the scanty data available concerning the

lady whom we venture (provisionally) to hold responsible for its composition.

In the year 55 A.D., when Paul on his last and fateful journey to Jerusalem became a guest in the house of her father Philip, then leader of the important church of Caesarea Palestinensis, she and her sisters were still unmarried but had a reputation as endowed with the gift of 'prophecy,' a gift then as always throughout the history of ecstatic 'control,' from earliest days to those of Mrs. Piper, at least as common among women as men. From this reputation, mentioned in Acts 21, 8-14 in the Diarist's account of a visit of warning made by "a certain prophet from Judaea, Agabus by name," who bound his own hands and feet with Paul's girdle, assuring him that its owner would meet a fate thus symbolized if he trusted himself in Jerusalem, we may be fairly sure that the "virgin daughters" were old enough at the time to remember well this memorable occasion, though the parenthetic clause, "This man (Philip) had four virgin daughters that prophesied," cannot be pressed to mean more than that they subsequently enjoyed this reputation. However, since Philip was first to take up the task of spreading the gospel after the persecution which arose about Stephen we may probably regard him as somewhat older than Paul, who is described in the story of Stephen's martyrdom as a "youth" (Acts 7, 58). Philip, named first after Stephen in the list of leaders of the hellenistic branch of the church (Acts 6, 5), must have been more than a youth. If Paul at this time (A.D. 33-38?) had attained the age of twenty — a minimum estimate — Philip's birth cannot have been far from the beginning of the Christian era. The date for the beginning of his work of evangelization in Samaria must be placed within the same limits.

Marriages were early in Judaea. We may think, then, of the four virgin daughters as ranging in age from ten to eighteen when Peter and John came to the aid of Philip in the unequal struggle of the recently founded church against the Gnostic heresy of Simon of Gitta and his followers, who in the time of Justin (150 A.D.), a native of Neapolis-Shechem, were overwhelmingly in the majority. Legendary as is the story of Acts

8, 9-13, and though it is supplemented in verses 14-25 by a later hand, we have at least the same right for attaching significance here to the association of the name of John with that of Peter as in the other occurrences in Luke-Acts. Peter was to play a part subsequently at Caesarea (whither Philip now betakes himself with his daughters), a part which strangely overlaps and eclipses that of his predecessor. Thus Philip remains entirely unmentioned in the account (Acts 9, 32-11, 18) of the founding of this great church, second to none save Jerusalem itself in the spread of the gospel. Only after Peter has moved on to Antioch (Gal. 2, 11) do we again hear, through the Diarist, of Philip at Caesarea, apparently as unconscious of Peter's intervention as Peter in the story of the conversion of Cornelius is unconscious of Philip.

Whatever Philip and his daughters might have had to say concerning the portrayal of Peter as original and sole founder of the church in Caesarea, we are more concerned at present with the obscurer story of John the son of Zebedee. For so far as Luke's narrative is concerned this is the final appearance of John. Outside of Jerusalem he figures exclusively in the evangelization of Samaria, and even here only as a voiceless satellite of Peter in the process of taking over Philip's work under the official and apostolic wing of Jerusalem. Thus the mission planted by the hellenists after "the persecution which arose about Stephen" is assured of the orthodoxy gravely threatened by the heresy of "Simon the Magian." All we learn from Luke of the further history of the church in Samaria is that Peter and John after having "testified and spoken the word of the Lord" in Samaria "returned to Jerusalem," though it is added that they also "evangelized many villages of the Samaritans."

What impression will have been left on the minds of the young daughters of Philip by the visit to Samaria of the two great apostles? For of the further work of Peter and John in Jerusalem, where they rank as 'pillars,' next in importance to James the Lord's brother, when Paul goes up thither from Antioch seeking relief from the harrassments of the Judaizers, Philip and his prophesying daughters cannot have remained ignorant at Caesarea. Let us limit ourselves to John, whose

brother James Herod slew with the sword early in 42, when the persecution broke forth which previously had scattered only the hellenistic branch of the church. Now, "twelve years" after the Ascension, the apostles themselves, previously left unmolested (Acts 8, 1), were made the victims of Agrippa's alliance with the Pharisees. They were "driven out" (1 Thess. 2, 15) until the sudden death of the tyrant in the summer of 44 made it once more safe to return.

That the daughters of Philip, whose home was now Caesarea, the half-gentile metropolis of Samaria, preserved vivid memories of that one of the two Sons of Thunder who still survived, cannot well be questioned. What became of him in the great dispersal of 42 may well have remained a mystery to them, but they must have known of his return to Jerusalem in 46-47 in time to meet Paul at the momentous conference where the 'pillars' endorsed his free gospel to the gentiles. The martyrdom suffered according to Papias at the hands of "the Jews," by which John, after the example of his brother, fulfilled their own undertaking and the prediction of the Lord regarding their death (Mt. 20, 22 f.), cannot have escaped the knowledge of Philip's family, not to say their bitter resentment, if it occurred, as the evidence indicates, at Jerusalem, together with the *other* James, some four years before the siege. Indeed the act of mob violence at Jerusalem may well have been the premonitory signal for the daughters' taking refuge along with their now aged father among "the churches of Asia"; for the new outbreaks which led to the great rebellion against Rome, compelling incidentally a second scattering of the church of "the apostles and elders" from Jerusalem, had their inception at Caesarea.

In this rapid survey of the drama enacted before the eyes of Philip's daughters prior to their removal to "Asia," one section has been purposely omitted. The section of hellenistic tradition which intervenes in Acts 8, 26-40 between the return of Peter and John from Samaria to Jerusalem and the story of Paul's conversion in 9, 1-31 tells so completely different a story of the spread of the gospel through agency of the great "evangelist" that many consider it necessary to assume another Philip as the hero. This story has, like the other, Jerusalem as its

starting-point, and at its conclusion (verse 40) brings Philip back by a sudden leap from Azotus-Ashdod to Caesarea. Only "in passing through (Philip) evangelized all the cities" (!) in the same wholesale manner as Peter and John with the villages of Samaria. For the rest, Acts 8, 26 ff. is merely a second version, later and more legendary, of the same all-important development related (with the improvement noted in verses 14-25) in the first half of the same chapter; namely, the effect of the dispersal of the hellenistic branch of the church (the *other* Philip was not concerned in this) in the dissemination of the gospel to the Greek-speaking world. In both versions the occasion is the same and the chief actor is the same; only, in the former the movement is a natural consequence of the persecution, its direction is northward to Samaria, then to Caesarea and ultimately, through secondary agents, to Antioch (Acts 11, 19); in the latter it is directed by angelic control, attended by miraculous support (verse 39), and effective in just the opposite direction. Philip is supernaturally directed to meet the eunuch of Candace returning from Jerusalem, and after converting and baptizing him evangelizes the whole plain of Philistia down to the border of Egypt. The eunuch, as secondary agent, becomes (in the language of Irenaeus) "the herald of the gospel to Ethiopia." Verse 40, with its unaccountable leap from Azotus to Caesarea, is, of course, Luke's editorial adjustment.

This later version of the extension of the gospel to the gentiles by express divine direction has its unmistakable affinities with that of Acts 9, 32-11, 18, where *Peter* is the apostle "chosen of God that by his mouth the gentiles might hear and believe" (Acts 15, 7). But the second Philippine version is just as inconsistent with the Petrine as its predecessor, in which Philip anticipates Peter both in Samaria and Caesarea. The only account which fully agrees with the Diarist and with Paul is the first Philippine, in which Philip's advance is such as already described, first to Samaria, thence to Caesarea; others of the original hellenistic group, "men of Cyprus and Cyrene," thereafter carry the gospel message to Antioch and beyond (Acts 11, 19 ff.).

The authentic career of Philip and his four daughters can thus be traced in Acts with tolerable precision down to the period of Paul's two years' detention there in *libera custodia* by direction of Felix (Acts 24, 27). It is to later authorities among the "churches of Asia" that we owe such knowledge as we have of their subsequent story.

It is commonly, and not unplausibly, assumed that the migration of the family to these less hostile shores was due to the ravages of the great war of 66-70; for these were felt, as we have seen, with early and special virulence at Caesarea. Philip's days of active service were now over. Two of his daughters, still unmarried, settled with their father at Hierapolis, where all three found a common tomb in due time. One of the daughters, however, had in the meantime married a Christian and settled with her husband in Ephesus, where her memory was cherished, as Polycrates informs us, down to his own time (195 A.D.). Of the fourth daughter and her fate we have no knowledge. Eusebius obtained reliable information from the pages of Papias of Hierapolis (140 A.D.) showing that several of the traditions reported by the Phrygian father were obtained from "the daughters of Philip," hardly at first hand. The intense millenarianism of Papias was also probably not unaffected by influence, direct or indirect, from the same quarter. We are now concerned, however, only with the married daughter, settled with her husband in the bosom of the church in Ephesus, a lady of perhaps forty to fifty years at the time of her arrival, if this be dated in 70 A.D., and at the appearance of the "book of prophecy" (Rev. 22, 18), a date determinable with exceptional precision as 93 A.D., sixty-three or upwards. Whether the lady survived for two, three, or possibly ten years after this date is not known. Polycrates only informs us that "she now rests at Ephesus."

Let us now turn from the conjectured authoress to the book itself, whose composition, from almost the beginning down to the present day, has been a subject of ardent and incessant controversy.

If there is one feature of the controversy which can be called a matter of common consent for all competent scholars of

modern times it is the agreement that the work is highly composite. Three opening chapters consist of Epistles of the Spirit addressed to the seven "churches of Asia," beginning with Ephesus. These contemplate conditions as they were toward the close of the first century and confirm the date definitely fixed by Irenaeus himself, on authority of those "in Asia," at "the end of the reign of Domitian." The churches have recently suffered persecution, and more is apprehended, but "John," through whom the Spirit conveys the exhortations and warnings, is chiefly concerned about the inroads of heresy, in particular of the "Nicolaitans" and followers of "Balaam," the seducer of Israel to idolatry and fornication. If the John in question be the Apostle, whose martyrdom can be "proved," in the judgment of R. H. Charles, our standard English commentator, to have taken place in Jerusalem between the years 62 and 66 A.D., he must be understood to be speaking "in the Spirit," independently of time; because Smyrna, one of the principal churches addressed, was by the admission in 115 A.D. of Polycarp, its own bishop, in Paul's time not yet in existence. Such prophetic utterance "in the Spirit" was in reality the assumption of the first supporters of the book, who for a century and a half never dreamed of any other authority behind it than "John, an apostle of the Lord" (thus Justin, converted in Ephesus in 125-135 A.D.).

The epilogue, attached after Rev. 21, 5, returns to the situation implied in the introduction. "John" again speaks in the first person, commending "the prophecies of this book" to the churches, assuring the readers of their divine origin and pronouncing an anathema against any alteration. As a single indication which we may add to the commonly cited proofs that introduction and epilogue are not from the same hand as the visions and prophecies which form the main contents of the work, we note that in 19, 10 the recipient of the central visions is warned by the revealing "angel" against any attempt at worship directed to himself: "See thou do it not. I am a fellow-servant with thee and thy brethren that hold the witness of Jesus." A somewhat unintelligent copy of this appears in the epilogue at 22, 8. "John" now renews the offer of worship to

the revealing angel. Are we to suppose that he had already forgotten the warning uttered so shortly before?

The relation of the introduction to the visions and prophecies which follow the opening of the door in heaven at 4, 1 is similar. The letters of the Spirit to the seven churches of Asia are full of phrases drawn from the incorporated visions. Every promise repeats them. But the visions themselves ignore "the churches of Asia" and their troubles. The horizon of the visions is strictly limited to Palestine. They are exclusively concerned with the great battle of Jerusalem and its "saints" against "Babylon the Great," the idolatrous mistress of the nations seated on her seven hills. Of heresy, the chief peril of the churches of Asia, there is no mention whatever.

The elaborate demonstrations of critics and commentators that the series of separate "books" and prophecies artificially strung together in the main body of the work belong to various dates and occasions in Palestine from 40-66 A.D., very superficially adjusted by editorial supplements to a later date and occasion, are scarcely needed to prove our main contention, namely, that raw material and re-casting, substance of the book and editorial envelope, belong to two completely different periods and environments.

Two examples will suffice.

(1) The extension of the list of seven Roman emperors in 13, 11-18 and 17, 11 ff. to include as an eighth the *Nero redivivus* by some identified with Domitian, the *Nero calvus*, is under any and every critical interpretation an editorial device of the character so common in apocalypses, by which time is gained for a fulfilment which did not occur when first expected, a literary setting-back of the clock.

(2) In 10, 8 ff. the seer is directed to begin a new series of prophecies. A "little book" is given him to consume, after eating which he is told that he must "prophesy again over many peoples and nations and tongues and kings." This introduces a new series of visions, the first of which deals with the last days of Jerusalem. The seer is given a measuring-rod wherewith to measure off the inner shrine of the temple and its worshippers, while the outer court and the city are "given over to the gen-

tiles to tread under foot forty and two months." Then comes a paragraph introducing the stereotyped figures of Jewish apocalypse, Moses and Elias, the two "witnesses of the Messiah," who preach repentance 1260 days; but when they have finished their testimony the beast from the abyss overcomes and kills the two witnesses, whose dead bodies lie for three and one half days unburied in the streets of the city, while apostate Jews and conquering gentiles make merry over them. At the expiration of the half-week, however, "the breath of life from God entered into them, and they stood upon their feet" to the terror of all beholders. "And they heard a great voice from heaven saying unto them, 'Come up hither.' And they went up to heaven in the cloud; and their enemies beheld them." The great repentance follows. An earthquake destroys a tenth part of the city, killing seven thousand persons. The rest "were affrighted and gave glory to the God of heaven."

Those who have interest and leisure may easily trace the origins of this typical Jewish apocalypse in Bousset's Legend of Antichrist and Charles's Commentary. The preaching of repentance by Moses and Elias in preparation for doomsday, figures identified here with the two "witnesses that stand in the divine presence" of Zech. 4, 3. 11-14, are perfectly well-known figures of current Jewish 'prophecy.' The point of special significance to our present inquiry is not the original meaning of this despairing vision of the last days of the siege in Jerusalem, but the comment of the Christian reviser who has adapted it to his (or her) own use by identifying the occasion and place of the martyrdom and the persons of the "two witnesses" (μαρτυρες) by the insertion of verse 8: "And their dead bodies lie in the street of the great city which spiritually is called Sodom and Egypt [that is, places from which God's chosen escape before their destruction], *where also their Lord was crucified.*" This supplement not only makes thorough work of christianizing the whole (Jewish?) apocalypse into which it has been inserted,¹ but explicitly identifies the two

¹ Three preëminent authorities, Harnack, Wellhausen, and Charles, to mention no others, have expressed the conviction that the Christian element for large portions of the central mass of Revelation is a very thin and superficial veneer covering purely

witnesses, the conventional Moses and Elias of Jewish mythology (verses 5-6), with two *Christian* martyrs of the last days of sinful Jerusalem. Only of such could the crucified Jesus be called "their Lord." A glance at Josephus' report of the martyrdom of James the Lord's brother in Jerusalem in 62-63 will show that the historian mentions "others" who suffered with him. Hegesippus's confused account is similarly suggestive of a second martyr who was stoned to death in the streets of Jerusalem on this same occasion. However this may be, the hand of the Christian reviser of this despairing vision of the deliverance of Jerusalem by repentance at the eleventh hour would seem not unaffected by Christian tradition, including a prophecy of Jesus, fulfilled, as Papias relates, in the bloody death of James and John, the former of whom was "slain by the Jews" under Herod Agrippa in 42, the latter under the high priest Ananus in 62.

These two examples of the incorporation of older material in Rev. 4-20 do not stand alone. They may be less effective for many than others which could easily be cited. They are merely types of those which have convinced all modern scholars of high repute that the so-called Revelation of John is not a uniform casting *aus einem Guss*, but a composition of many prophecies of various dates, its central portion consisting largely of Palestinian, perhaps in part pre-Christian, material.

Jewish apocalypse. Now we have no extant evidence, unless by inference from the sobriquet 'Sons of Wrath' (Boanerges: cf. Lk. 9, 54), rendered 'Sons of Thunder' in Mk. 3, 17, to show that John the Apostle was more gifted in 'prophecy' than others of the Twelve, though the names of Agabus, Judas, and Silas are sufficient warrant for the belief that the Judaean church was exceptionally well endowed in this respect.

On the other hand it is of record that the greatest Jewish teacher of the period, a strict contemporary of the Apostles, who escaped with his disciples to the camp of Vespasian during the siege of Jerusalem to become afterwards chief founder of the celebrated school of 'Teachers' (*Tannaim*) at Jamnia, one who by a curious coincidence bore the same name as the Apostle, was notoriously given to the apocalyptic type of teaching.

For a Christian 'prophets' at Caesarea it may well have been a matter of no small difficulty to differentiate between reported teachings of John the son of Zebedee and teachings of John the son of Zacchaeus (Johanan ben Zacchai), also reported to her at Caesarea from Jerusalem during the same period and from Jamnia thereafter during her residence in Asia.

Why, then, not be satisfied with the conclusions of R. H. Charles, the unrivalled expert among English scholars in the history of apocalyptic literature, as patient and methodical in his linguistic study as he is bold in critical discrimination? A large and increasing proportion of the ablest scholars admit the claim of Charles to have now placed the evidence of the martyr death of the Apostle John in Jerusalem between 62 and 66 A.D. on the level of demonstration. This we have already noted. But he offers abundant compensation. Ephesus, in his belief, had no less than two other Johns in the period of the 'Johannine' literature.

We fully agree to Charles's linguistic proofs supplementary to the able studies of Brooke, that the gospel and three anonymous epistles, two of which bear the superscription "the Elder," are products of the same hand and brain, whatever editorial revision the gospel may have undergone at the hands of the writer who attaches the appendix, cautiously suggesting the Apostle as author of the work in spite of certain notions admitted to be current concerning his martyr fate. Here, then, would seem to be proof of that "Elder John" at Ephesus supplied by Eusebius from a neglected passage of Papias to complete the conjecture of Dionysius of Alexandria.

Again, we gladly ratify and endorse the proof of Dionysius as supplemented by Charles that this "John the prophet" (Charles's J^{ap}) cannot possibly be identified with the Elder, author of epistles and gospel. Certain desperate attempts at this identification made by modern scholars fearful of too many hypothetical Johns at Ephesus will soon, we believe with Charles, be consigned to merited oblivion. Does not this demonstration furnish the desired solution of the long-debated problem?

We believe that it does not. The fatal objection is the oversupply of Johns. John the prophet and John the elder of Ephesus are both products of undiluted higher-critical imagination, "born out of due time." The former is a creation of Dionysius to meet the requirement of a substitute on whom to father the distasteful book of the Revelation brandished by his millenarian opponent Nepos. The latter, the Elder John of Ephesus, is an

equally baseless creation of Eusebius to reënforce the theory of Dionysius.

It is incredible that even one other John at Ephesus should have remained in successful incognito for more than a century, evading the search of determined inquirers through two prolonged and violent controversies, the Chiliastic, centring on the authorship of Revelation, and the Montanistic, involving vigorous denial of the traditional authorship of the gospel and epistles, to appear at last serenely as a discovery of acute, though much belated, higher criticism.

Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus, sixty-five years of age in 195 A.D., when he wrote, after conference with, and on behalf of, a council of all the leading bishops of Asia, in protest against the arrogant threat of Victor of Rome to excommunicate them for their quartodeciman practice, begins by citing a whole array of Asian "apostolic" authorities against those boasted by Victor. Polycrates was one of a family of whom seven had been bishops before him, and was assisted by "a great multitude" of Asian bishops as eager as himself to call to the witness-stand every quartodeciman authority the province could boast. They cite Philip of Hierapolis with his prophesying daughters, *then* the great Apostle, *then* Polycarp of Smyrna, Thraseas of Eumenia, Sagaris of Laodicea, Papirius, Melito of Sardis. Is it conceivable that the other Johns imagined by the higher critics, of whom one at least is conceived as an outstanding quartodeciman, should have been overlooked by this council of bishops?

Is it conceivable for Dionysius himself, eager to discover a "prophet John" at Ephesus, sifting its records to find one of the name but obliged to content himself with the paltry result of two alleged tombs (*μνήματα*) of the Apostle, and the reflection that Mark, companion of Peter and Paul, in his youth at Jerusalem had borne also the name of John (Acts 12, 12), if the records in question had mentioned this other? The aid of Eusebius is vain, because Eusebius is too honest to deny that he could find in the pages of Papias, which he read and re-read for the purpose, nothing to the point save a passage which but for the thick-and-thin advocates of the Irenaeian tradition, and

advocates no less determined of the 'other John' theory, would instantly be recognized as referring to the Elder John of *Jerusalem*, a contemporary member of the famous college of "elders, the disciples (or 'successors') of the Apostles," whose death is dated by Epiphanius in the last year of Trajan (117-118 A.D.).

If neither the Chiliastic nor the Montanistic controversy, each of which had its focus in the province of Asia, nor the Paschal controversy, which involved corresponding historical research, brought forth a shadow of suggestion of the existence of any other John in Asia than the Apostle, for whose residence there all pointed to the Revelation, it is reasonable to dismiss the later creations of third and fourth century disputes about the canon as belonging to the realm of higher-critical mythology.

But R. H. Charles holds with Papias that Rev. 1, 9-11 is "worthy of belief" (ἀξιόπιστος). He does me the honor to repeat (with improvements) the substance of my argument, printed thirty years ago in my Introduction to the New Testament (1900, pp. 231-234), pleading exemption for Revelation from the general rule that apocalypses, Jewish and Christian, are pseudonymous.

Unfortunately just these pages stand first and foremost in the group which I have vainly begged the publishers to be permitted to recast in some one of the series of reprints which year after year have been issued without so much as notification to the author. The substance of this re-cast, as marked many years ago in my personal copy, must be reproduced here for lack of such a privilege.

Charles renews my plea for Hermas as an example of a Christian exception to the rule. That is true, as well as the argument that some of the reasons which led Jewish apocalyp-
tists to adopt the device of pseudonymity ceased to apply in the case of Christian writers. But not even Charles would contend for a general reform in this respect — witness, for instance, the Apocalypse of Peter, nor do the reasons given in explanation of the practice go to the heart of the matter. For the most fundamental of all we must appreciate the nature of 'prophecy' as understood more specifically in Samaria and Phrygia than elsewhere. It is also the key to what Norden has designated

the "I-style," and what Celsus observed in "Phoenicia" in the second century, what the fathers complain of as the self-deifying utterances of the Samaritan school of Gnostics, and (if we be not mistaken) to the denunciation in Mk. 13, 6. 22 of the "false prophets" who proclaim "I am" and work "signs and wonders."

It is quite true that the apocalypticist, in New Testament parlance the "prophet," more especially the prophetess, against whose utterances there was greater objection (1 Cor. 14, 34), felt keenly the need of higher authority than his (or more especially her) own obscure name could supply. This explains in part, but only in part, the borrowing of great names from the religious, particularly the prophetic, past. But certain more important and significant phenomena of 'prophecy,' especially conspicuous in christianized Samaria and in Phrygia, whose 'prophets' and 'prophetesses' expressly traced their succession back through Philip's prophesying daughters, are not thus explicable. The self-deifying utterances of the dervishes (so moderns would call them) encountered by Celsus in Phoenicia, the similar utterances imputed by the fathers to Simon of Gitta and his school of Magian wonder-workers, with those of Elxai and his female successors in Transjordanian, and of Maximilla the Phrygian prophetess and follower of Montanus, have but a remote relation to pseudepigraphy. There can be no other explanation of these utterances than impersonation, the favorite device of the medium, especially the female medium, from the days of the witch of Endor to the latest séance.

Asterius Urbanus, the anti-montanistic writer quoted by Eusebius (H. E. v. 16, 17) tells of Maximilla's protest when the bishops of Asia attempted to silence her 'prophecies.' The woman cried out: "I am driven away from the sheep like a wolf. I am not a wolf. I am Word (*λόγος*) and Spirit (*πνεῦμα*) and Power (*δύναμις*)." This is a typical example of the 'I-style.' The prophetess impersonates the revealing 'control' by which she believes herself inspired. In the case of the Samaritan heresiarchs this inspiration was regarded as not only communicating divine utterance but divine powers as well. Christian 'prophecy' in Ephesus under the bitter persecution of Domi-

tian, confronted also by the subtle inroads of loose-moraled Gnosticism, is likely to have felt the impulse and traditional examples of the Son of Thunder but recently martyred in Jerusalem. At least one of their number could actually recall his coming to Samaria in aid of her father against Gnostic heresy there. She is likely to have been in ignorance of his whereabouts during the persecution of Agrippa which cost the other Son of Thunder his life and drove the rest of the Twelve into hiding. But she surely had knowledge of his later work in Jerusalem and above all of the martyr death which crowned it in the city "which spiritually is called Sodom and Egypt, where also their Lord was crucified."

The writer of Revelation *impersonates* the Apostle John. He is not spoken of as an apostle, but as a 'prophet,' for the same reason that even Irenaeus, when speaking of the 'teachings' (μαθήματα) derived through Papias from 'John' habitually speaks of him not as an 'apostle' but as a 'disciple' (μαθητής). It is John's authority as a prophet that is wanted. Who else but a 'prophet' could foresee, in the Spirit, the needs and vicissitudes of the churches of Asia a half-century later from his rocky pulpit in Patmos, the penal colony whose shores were dimly visible from the heights around Ephesus, where the apostle is conceived as transported "for the word of God and the testimony of Jesus"?

We shall not employ as serious argument for the conjecture here advanced any added significance which may appear to be taken on by the reference to "that woman Jezebel which calleth herself a prophetess" (Rev. 2, 20) when viewed in the light of a feline amenity; nor even from the bitterness apparent in the reference to the bloody scenes in the streets of Jerusalem, the city that "killeth the prophets and stoneth them that are sent unto her." We only maintain that if it be proved that the Apostle John suffered martyrdom before the siege, then the writer of Revelation, a book certainly later in date, can only employ his name and authority, as Revelation employs it, by impersonation; since an actual prophet John in Ephesus at this time is excluded by all rules of evidence. If impersonation of this type be indistinguishable from the harsh term of pseu-

donymity, then let our opponents make the most of it. The proposition here advanced is simply this: Supposing *impersonation* to be the true explanation of the form in which the masses of earlier Palestinian prophecy, Christian and pre-Christian, have been incorporated into the endlessly disputed Ephesian apocalypse, then no name ever has been mentioned, or seems likely to be mentioned, as its compiler, having greater verisimilitude than the name of the prophesying daughter of Philip the evangelist.

Gentlemen colleagues of the higher criticism, our conjecture has come out into the open. It stands unguarded, inviting your shafts of disproof. *Messieurs, c'est à votre tour; tirez.*